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I. CARRIER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
EXAS Association of Counties v. Matagorda County: Texas Su-
preme Court Denies Insurer Right to Reimbursement for Settling
Uncovered Claims Under Reservation of Rights
Probably the most anticipated insurance-related opinion during the
Survey period was the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Texas Associa-
tion of Counties County Government Risk Management Pool v. Mata-
gorda County.' In that case, the Texas Supreme Court held that a liability
insurer was not entitled to reimbursement from its insured for the
amount paid by the insurer, under a reservation of rights, to settle an
excluded claim. The underlying litigation arose in 1993, when inmates
assaulted three other prisoners (the "Coseboon plaintiffs"). The
Coseboon plaintiffs sued the insured, Matagorda County and its sheriff,
both of whom demanded that the Texas Association of Counties County
Government Risk Management Pool ("TAC") defend and indemnify
them under a law enforcement liability insurance policy. TAC initially
denied coverage because of the jail exclusion; however, after negotiations
with the insured, TAC agreed to pay the defense costs incurred by the
insured's counsel, subject to a reservation of rights to continue to deny
coverage. 2 TAC also filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a decla-
ration that the claims were not covered.3
The Coseboon plaintiffs eventually offered to settle their lawsuit for
$300,000, which was within the policy limits. The insured demanded that
TAC settle the claim, and TAC stated that it would settle subject to a
reservation of rights and that it would seek reimbursement from the in-
sured. The insured did not object to the settlement and stipulated that it
did not dispute the reasonableness of TAC's settlement of the litigation.
After the settlement, TAC amended its declaratory judgment action. In
the amended petition, TAC sought reimbursement of the settlement
funds. The trial court entered judgment for TAC on the coverage issues,
and it awarded TAC $300,000 for its settlement payment, together with
interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. The insured appealed. "The court of
appeals concluded that no equitable remedy allowed TAC to recover the
settlement funds and that there was no indication that the County agreed
either to be bound by the settlement or to reimburse TAC. ''4 The court
of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that TAC take nothing. TAC
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. 5
As a matter of first impression, the court considered whether an in-
surer may seek reimbursement of settlement funds from its insured, paid
1. Tex. Ass'n of Counties County Gov't Risk Mgmt. Pool v. Matagorda County, 52
S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2000).
2. Id. at 129.
3. Id. at 129.
4. Id. at 130-31.
5. Id. at 131.
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under a reservation of rights, upon an adjudication of noncoverage. TAC
argued that a right of reimbursement was consistent with the express allo-
cation of risk agreed to and accepted by the insured in the coverage docu-
ment. TAC pointed out that claims not covered under the policy
remained the responsibility of the insured; therefore, the insured should
be required to contribute its full share of liability for reasonable amounts
paid to settle contractually excluded claims. The Texas Supreme Court
rejected this argument, holding that a right of reimbursement was not
supported by any express agreement between TAC and the insured.6 The
court suggested that an insurer is not entitled to reimbursement from its
insured for payment of non-covered claims, unless the insurance contract
expressly provides for reimbursement or the parties otherwise agree to
such a right. The Court further suggested that when TAC notified the
insured that TAC would fund the settlement subject to a reservation of
rights and that it would seek reimbursement from the insured, TAC uni-
laterally attempted to create additional rights not contained in the cover-
age document. Therefore, TAC's reservation letter was ineffective. 7
TAC also maintained that a right to reimbursement is consistent with
Texas public policy, because it encourages settlement, reduces litigation,
and eliminates uncertainty by capping the insured's liability for third-
party claims. Specifically, TAC explained that if an insurer is not permit-
ted to take advantage of a reasonable settlement opportunity prior to
resolution of the coverage dispute, then the insured faces potentially
greater liability to the third-party claimant and increased costs associated
with defending the underlying lawsuit. This is in addition to the costs of
defending the declaratory judgment action and a possible attorneys' fee
award in favor of the insurer under the Declaratory Judgment Act. On
the other hand, if an insurer can obtain a favorable settlement of the un-
derlying claim without fear of waiving its coverage defenses, costs of de-
fending the underlying claim can be significantly reduced, or even
eliminated in some cases, and the insured's liability will be capped at a
reasonable, liquidated amount. The Texas Supreme Court appeared to
recognize that denying reimbursement places insurers in an untenable po-
sition. However, the court held that the "insurers are better positioned to
handle this risk, either by drafting policies to specifically provide for re-
imbursement or by accounting for the possibility that they may occasion-
ally pay uncovered claims in their rate structure."8
TAC further argued that the insured was unjustly enriched as a result
of TAC's payment of the non-covered claim and that reimbursement was
consistent with the equitable principles of quantum meruit and unjust en-
richment. TAC contended that the equities in the case weighed in favor
of allowing a right of reimbursement. 9 Thus, TAC argued that an obliga-
6. Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d at 131.
7. Id. at 131-32.
8. See id. at 135.
9. Specifically, TAC pointed out that: (1) it dealt with the insured fairly and in good
faith, (2) it provided a defense under a reservation of rights rather than standing rigidly by
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tion of reimbursement should be imposed to prevent the insured from
being unjustly enriched. Despite the clear windfall to the insured, the
Texas Supreme Court refused to recognize a quasi-contractual right of
reimbursement. The court explained that the insured's clear and une-
quivocal consent to settlement and agreement to permit the insurer to
seek reimbursement is required, "[o]therwise, the insured is forced to
choose between rejecting a settlement within policy limits or accepting a
possible financial obligation to pay an amount that may be beyond its
means at a time when the insured is most vulnerable." 10 Thus, the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding that TAC was not
entitled to recover the cost of settling the uncovered claim.
Justice Owen and Justice Hecht argued in the dissent that an obligation
of reimbursement should be imposed to prevent the insured from being
unjustly enriched. Specifically, the dissent stated:
An obligation of reimbursement should be imposed when an insurer
pays an amount that the insured agrees is reasonable to settle a claim
that is not covered. This rule of law would preserve the respective
rights and obligations of parties to an insurance contract. An insured
would be responsible for liabilities it incurs that are not covered by
the policy of insurance. In this case, there is no principled basis for
requiring [TAC] rather than Matagorda County to bear the cost of
settling the Coseboon litigation. There is no dispute that the amount
the [insurer] paid to settle the matter was reasonable. Matagorda
County is receiving a benefit for which it did not bargain-payment
of a claim that was not covered under its agreement with [TAC].
Matagorda County has been unjustly enriched because it paid noth-
ing to settle a serious claim against it. [TAC] has paid an obligation
that was Matagorda County's alone.11
Although the Texas Supreme Court's decision did not address defense
costs, Justice Hecht observed in the dissent that the holding would pre-
clude a right of reimbursement for defense costs. Specifically, Justice
Hecht raised concerns about the court's statement that "a unilateral res-
ervation-of-rights letter cannot create rights not contained in the insur-
its original denial, (3) when the opportunity arose to settle the Coseboon claim for a rea-
sonable amount, TAC funded the settlement despite the coverage dispute, benefiting the
insured by capping its liability at a reasonable amount, (4) TAC did not force the settle-
ment on the insured, but rather obtained the exact result the insured wanted, and (5) the
insured was put on notice that TAC expected to be reimbursed for the settlement if it was
later determined that the claim was not covered.
10. 52 S.W.3d at 134. In reference to this argument, the dissent observes:
A reasonable settlement offer is one that the insured, acting as a person of
ordinary care and prudence, would accept. In situations like the one before
us, when there was a coverage dispute, an insured's knowledge that it ulti-
mately may have to fund a settlement offer will cause the insured to make a
fair evaluation of whether the settlement offer is in fact a reasonable one.
But regardless of the size of the claim that is not covered, the financial obli-
gation to pay the claim remains with the insured. An insured's lack of finan-





ance policy. '' 12 The dissent points out that this statement is "not only
overly broad, but is a misstatement."' 3 For example, the dissent explains
that an insurer "can bind itself in a reservation-of-rights letter to pay de-
fense costs," even if the claims are not covered, by reserving its rights
only as to indemnity. 14 The dissent explained that under Texas law,
where an insurance company tenders a defense subject to a reservation of
rights, the insured may either accept the tendered defense or it may re-
fuse the tendered defense and defend itself.15 If the insured defends it-
self, then the insured must pay the defense costs if the claims are
excluded by the applicable policy. The dissent opines that the insured
should be responsible for the cost incurred in defending excluded claims
regardless of whether it accepts the tendered defense or defends itself.16
Thus, the dissent warns insurers that this decision may foreshadow how
the Court will address this issue if it is presented. 17
II. EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
In 2001, Texas courts continued the trend of making it more difficult
for a plaintiff to recover on extra-contractual claims. The appellate
courts confirmed that an insured must first establish that an insurer
breached its contractual duty as a prerequisite to recover on an extra-
contractual claim. Several courts' decisions reinforced the rule that an
insurer does not commit bad faith merely because it makes an incorrect
coverage determination. The courts clarified that insurers are not liable
for the tort of bad faith for denying questionable claims so long as the
insurer had a reasonable basis to deny or delay payment even if the basis
is eventually determined by the fact finder to be erroneous. Thus, in-
sureds must overcome a difficult burden in order to prevail on extra-con-
tractual claims.
A. Dun, OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
1. No Liability Absent Proof of Breach of Contract
Gates v. State Farm: Insured's Failure to Establish Breach of Contract
Negated Essential Element of Bad Faith Claim
In Gates v. State Farm County Mutual Insurance Co. of Texas,18 the
Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether a final judgment in favor of
12. Id. at 140.
13. Id.
14. Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d at 140-41.
15. Id. at 140-41.
16. Id.
17. The court of appeals recognized a right to reimbursement of defense costs. Other
jurisdictions have also recognized a right to reimbursement for defense costs of excluded
claims. Thus, the denial of such defense costs appears to be inconsistent with the trend in
other jurisdictions. See Buss v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 939 P.2d 766
(1997).
18. 53 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
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an insurer on a breach of contract claim precludes an insured's bad faith
claim as a matter of law. This case arose after the insureds filed a claim
with their insurer, State Farm, as a result of an automobile accident with
an uninsured motorist. After they were unable to reach a settlement with
State Farm, the insureds filed suit against State Farm asserting claims for
breach of contract and bad faith. The court severed the contractual claim
from the bad faith claims and abated the bad faith claims until the con-
tractual claims were resolved. In the contract action, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. The insureds did not
appeal that judgment, and it became final.
In the bad faith action, the insureds alleged that State Farm breached
its common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing by (1) refusing to pay
their claim without a reasonable basis to do so, (2) making substantially
inadequate settlement offers, and (3) failing to properly investigate the
claim.19 The insureds sought to recover the policy limit of their uninsured/
underinsured motorist coverage, as well as damages for mental anguish.
After the judgment in the contract claim became final, State Farm moved
for summary judgment on the bad faith claim in part on the ground that
the insureds' failure to prevail on the contract claim precluded any recov-
ery based on bad faith denial of the claim. Without explanation, the trial
court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment.20
On appeal, the insureds argued that their bad faith claim was not auto-
matically precluded simply because their contract claim was dismissed on
summary judgment. Specifically, the insureds asserted that there was
some evidence of coverage and that they lost their breach of contract suit
only because they failed to prove damages and causation. Thus, the in-
sureds argued that because contract and tort claims are separate and be-
cause they presented some evidence of coverage, the final judgment on
their breach of contract claims should not preclude their bad faith claims.
The court of appeals rejected this argument, stating that "in most circum-
stances, an insured may not prevail on a bad faith claim without first
showing that the insurer breached the contract. ' 21 The court held that
the summary judgment evidence conclusively established the existence of
a reasonable basis to deny the insured's claim (i.e., that the claim was not
covered), thereby negating an essential element of the insureds' common-
law bad faith claims. Moreover, the court noted that "to allow the [in-
sureds] to present evidence of a contract breach in a later lawsuit after an
adverse determination on the merits would be an impermissible collateral
attack on the final judgment in the contract case."'22 Accordingly, the
court held that State Farm's final judgment on the insureds' breach of
contract claims precluded, as a matter of law, recovery on the insureds'
19. Id. at 828.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 830 (quoting Liberty Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex.
1996)).
22. Id. at 830.
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bad faith claims stemming from the same accident. 23
Laas v. State Farm: No Bad Faith Where Insurer is Found Liable for an
Amount Less Than the Amount It Offered to Settle a Disputed Claim
The Houston Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Laas v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. 24 In that case, the insureds obtained
property damage and personal injury policy limits from the insurer of the
driver of the other vehicle following an automobile accident. The in-
sureds then sued their insurer, State Farm, to recover underinsured mo-
torist benefits. The insureds alleged that State Farm breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing and violated Article 21 of the Insurance Code.
The trial court severed the extra-contractual claims from the contract
claim. The insureds obtained a judgment on the property damage claim
for $1,746, which represented the total property damage less the insureds'
deductible and the payment already received from the other driver's in-
surer. The jury awarded a verdict on the personal injury claim in the
amount of $9,410. Because this amount was less than the amount paid to
the insureds by the other driver's insurer, the trial court entered a final
judgment that the insureds take nothing on their personal injury claim
against State Farm and their Article 21.55 claim. The trial court also dis-
missed the insureds' extra-contractual claims.
Although the trial court's order did not state the basis for the dismissal
of the extra-contractual claims, the court of appeals stated that it was
clear from the record that the "dismissal ... was based on the court's
determination that [the] insurance code and bad faith claims were
moot."'25 The insureds waived their right to challenge the judgment on
the Article 21.55 and breach of duty claims.26 Therefore, the court of
appeals addressed only the Article 21.21 claim. In addressing this claim,
the court noted the principles governing the issue:
If the insurer is found liable for an amount equal to or less than its
highest settlement offer, then the bad faith claims (under article
21.21) will be rendered moot .... This is because the extra-contrac-
tual claims are based on allegations of bad faith in investigating the
plaintiff's claims and inadequate settlement offers. If an insurer
prevails on liability, or if the finder of fact concludes that the plain-
tiff's damages do not exceed the insurer's settlement offer, then the
insurer's conduct necessarily cannot have been in bad faith.27
23. Gates, 53 S.W.3d at 830.
24. No. 96-36414-A, 2001 WL 1479228 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 1, 2001,
no pet.) (no publication).
25. Id. at *2.
26. The insureds waived their challenge to the breach of good faith and fair dealing
claim by failing to address the claim in their appellate brief. The insureds also waived their
points of error challenging the take nothing judgment on the Article 21.55 claim because
they failed to cite to the record and present arguments supporting their contentions.
27. Id. at *4 (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding)).
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Applying these principles, the Houston Court of Appeals determined
that State Farm's conduct necessarily could not have been in bad faith,
because State Farm was found liable for an amount less than the amount
it had offered to settle the disputed claim. Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment.
2. Tort Liability for Failure to Defend
Southstar v. St. Paul: Breach of Contractual Duty to Defend Does Not
Give Rise to Tort Claims for Negligence and D TPA Violations; However,
Insurer's Misrepresentations Prior to Decision Not to Defend May Give
Rise to Separate Tort Action
In Southstar Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co.,28 the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals considered whether a tort cause of action may
be brought based on an insurer's breach of its duty to defend. The in-
sured sued its commercial general liability insurer to recover for the car-
rier's refusal to provide a defense in an underlying lawsuit. In addition to
seeking recovery for breach of contract, the insured also alleged breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation of the pol-
icy's coverage, violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA"),
and negligence. The insurer moved for summary judgment on all claims
arguing that it had no duty to defend and that a tort cause of action may
not be brought based on an insured's breach of the duty to defend. The
district court granted summary judgment for the insurer, and the insured
appealed the ruling as to the claims for negligence, violations of the
DTPA, and misrepresentation. 29
On appeal, the court addressed the insurer's contention that a tort
cause of action could not be brought based on an insured's breach of the
duty to defend. The court noted that although the Texas Supreme Court
has not addressed this precise issue, in Maryland Insurance Co. v. Head
Industries Coatings & Services, the court held that "an insured is fully
protected against his insurer's refusal to defend or mishandling of a third-
party claim by his contractual and Stowers rights."'30 The court further
noted in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Traver, where
the allegations against the insurer arose from the insurer's own miscon-
duct and not merely from the refusal to defend, "the claims against the
insured were not limited by Head to the insurance policy limits and de-
fense costs."' 31 Thus, based on Head and Traver, the court of appeals con-
cluded that "an insured who alleges only that the insurer wrongfully
refused a defense is limited to bringing Stowers claims and claims under
28. 42 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.)
29. Id. at 189.
30. Id. at 192 (quoting Md. Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Serv., Inc., 938 S.W.2d
27, 28-29 (Tex. 1996)).





The court of appeals then looked to a sister court's decision addressing
whether a tort cause of action exists for an insurer's wrongful refusal or
failure to defend. The court noted that in United Services Automobile
Association v. Pennington,33 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
in order for a tort duty to arise out of a contractual duty, the liability must
arise "independent of the fact that a contract exists between the par-
ties."'34 Applying that rule to the facts in this case, the court of appeals
found that the insurer's liability for negligence did not arise independent
of the insurance agreement. Rather, the insurer's liability was based on
its failure to defend or non-performance under the insurance policy. Be-
cause the act giving rise to liability for negligence was the insurer's breach
of its duty to defend under the insurance agreement, the court held that
the insured's claims for negligence and gross negligence were barred as a
matter of law. Likewise, the court found that the insured's claims under
the DTPA were also linked to the breach of the duty to defend under the
insurance agreement and were, therefore, barred.35
The court, however, found that the insured's misrepresentation claim
was not based on the breach of the duty to defend because the insurer
allegedly misrepresented the policy prior to its decision not to defend the
insured. Since the misrepresentation claim did not concern the non-per-
formance of the insurance agreement, the court held that it "may be
brought independent of the claim for breach of the duty to defend under
the insurance agreement. ' 36 Accordingly, the court reversed and re-
manded the trial court's granting of the summary judgment on the claim,
thereby leaving open the possibility for a misrepresentation claim.37
3. No Bad Faith for Bona Fide Coverage Dispute
King v. State Farm: Insurers May Deny Questionable Claims Without
Being Subject to Liability for an Erroneous Denial of the Claim
In King v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,38 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas articulated the
difficult burden that insureds face in proving a bad faith claim. In this
case, the insured was injured in an automobile accident, then subse-
quently injured himself several days later by falling off a ladder at his
home. Thirteen weeks after the automobile accident, the insured com-
plained of back pain and sought extensive medical treatment for his back,
32. Id. at 192.
33. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Pennington, 810 S.W.2d 777, 783-84 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, no writ).
34. Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Delanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex.
1991).
35. Southstar Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 42 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2001, no. pet.).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 194.
38. No. Civ. A-3:00CV2424D, 2001 WL 694576 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2001).
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including 56 sessions of physical therapy, at a cost of more than $20,000.
The insured then demanded that State Farm pay the expenses under the
UM/UIM provisions of the policy. State Farm compensated the insured
for his lost wages and medical expenses incurred at the hospital following
the automobile accident only up to the PIP policy limit of $2,500. How-
ever, State Farm denied the additional expenses based on its investigation
of the insured's medical information and on the insured's "failure to com-
plain of, or receive treatment for, neck or back pain until thirteen weeks
after the automobile accident. '39
The insured sued State Farm alleging claims for breach of contract, vio-
lation of the Insurance Code, and breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. State Farm moved for summary judgment on the extra-con-
tractual claims alleging that it was never able to determine that the treat-
ment the insured received was reasonable and necessary as a result of his
automobile accident. The court first addressed the bad faith claim, noting
that if State Farm was entitled to summary judgment on that claim, the
insured's insurance code claims would fail as well.4 0 The court then dis-
cussed the difficult burden that an insured must satisfy to prevail on a bad
faith claim:
In order to sustain such a claim, the insured must establish the ab-
sence of a reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of the
claim and that the insurer knew, or should have known, that there
was no reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of the
claim. The insured must prove that there were no facts before the
insurer which, if believed, would justify denial of the claim. How-
ever, insurance carriers maintain the right to deny questionable
claims without being subject to liability for an erroneous denial of
the claim. A bona fide controversy is sufficient reason for failure of
an insurer to make a prompt payment of a loss claim. As long as the
insurer has a reasonable basis to deny or delay payment of a claim,
even if that basis is eventually determined by the fact finder to be
erroneous, the insurer is not liable for the tort of bad faith.41
The court explained that "the focus of a bad faith inquiry is on the
reasonableness of the insurer's conduct in rejecting or delaying payment
of the claim which is determined by viewing the facts available to the
insurer at the time of denial."42 The court noted that "an insurer will not
escape liability by failing to investigate a claim so that it can contend that
liability was never reasonably clear, and will breach its duty of good faith
and fair dealing by failing reasonably to investigate a claim."'43 The court
39. Id. at *1.
40. Id. at *2 (citing Higginbotham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 456, 460
(5th Cir. 1997)). The court explained that under Texas law, "an insured may not prevail on
a cause of action under Article 21.21 if his claim for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing lacks merit as a matter of law." Id.
41. Id. at *2 (citing Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987)).
42. Id.
43. King, 2001 WL 694576, at *2.
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further noted that the duty to investigate is limited, and, if, after reasona-
ble investigation, there is evidence showing that the insured's claim may
be invalid, then the insured's bad faith action is not viable. Applying
these principles to the facts, the court found that there was evidence
showing that the insured's claim of injury due to the automobile accident
may be false and that the insured's back and neck injuries may have been
caused when he fell off a ladder at his home. Accordingly, the court sum-
marily dismissed the bad faith claim.44
Bryan v. Zenith: No Bad Faith When Insurer Properly Investigates
Claim
Although Texas courts are reluctant to dispense bad faith claims on
summary judgment, it is appropriate where there is no evidence that the
insurer's liability is reasonably clear nor evidence that it breached its duty
to investigate a claim. Bryan v. Zenith Insurance Co.,45 provides a good
example of an insurer's investigation that was sufficient to preclude a
finding of bad faith as a matter of law. In this case, Mary Bryan applied
for survivor's benefits under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act after
her husband, James Bryan, suffered a fatal heart attack on the job.
Zenith Insurance Company denied coverage for the claim based on the
Chief Medical Examiner's conclusion that the insured's death was caused
by pre-existing heart disease. Bryan sought review of the denial of her
claim through the administrative process with the Texas Workers' Com-
pensation Commission, and the death was held to be non-compensable.
Bryan then filed suit in district court seeking judicial review of the final
administrative decision on the workers' compensation claim. Bryan also
added a bad faith claim against Zenith regarding its claims-handling pro-
cedure. The trial court severed the bad faith claim. After a trial on the
merits, the court entered judgment for Zenith on the workers' compensa-
tion claim. The court then proceeded with the bad faith claims in the
severed action and granted summary judgment in favor of Zenith. 46
On appeal, Bryan argued that, despite the ruling that the claim was not
covered, the bad faith claim could still exist. In addressing the bad faith
claims, the Austin Court of Appeals noted that Zenith would be liable for
denying the claim "if it knew or should have known that it was reasonably
clear that the claim was covered."' 47 Based on the facts, the court of ap-
peals found that coverage was not reasonably clear when Zenith denied
44. Id. at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2001). The insured's employment records indicated
that he worked 8-12 hours a day after the accident until his subsequent injury at his home.
The insured also did not seek further medical treatment "until after he fell off the ladder,
almost two weeks after the automobile accident, and then waited an additional eleven
weeks before undergoing the medical diagnoses that were the subject of his alleged dam-
ages." Id.
45. No. 99-02417-A, 2001 WL 838873 (Tex. App.-Austin July 2, 2001, no pet.) (no
publication).
46. Id. at *1.
47. Id. at *3 (citing Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 56 (Tex. 1997)).
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the claim. Specifically, the court noted that Zenith initially denied the
claim based on the autopsy report, which indicated that heart disease was
the cause of death. The court further noted that Zenith sought a second
and third medical opinion, which confirmed the cause of death was from
heart disease. Because the three medical opinions provided a reasonable
basis for Zenith's conclusion that James Bryan's heart attack was the re-
sult of heart disease instead of a work-related event, the court held "that
there could be no claim that liability was reasonable clear, as required for
a holding of bad faith."48
As another ground for asserting a bad faith claim, Bryan alleged that
Zenith failed to properly investigate the claim by failing to investigate the
issue of James Bryan's physical exertion on the day of his death. The
court of appeals acknowledged that although liability must be reasonably
clear before an insurer's denial is deemed in bad faith, insurers have a
duty to properly investigate claims. The court of appeals further noted
that "[i]nsurers may not neglect investigation so as to prevent liability
from ever becoming reasonably clear."'49 The court explained that an in-
surance company breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing if it fails
to reasonably investigate a claim. Thus, despite the determination that
the claim was not covered, the court evaluated Bryan's claim that Zenith
breached its duty by failing to obtain an alleged videotape from the de-
ceased's employer or other related evidence. The court found that
Zenith had requested the alleged videotape from the deceased's em-
ployer but was never furnished the tape. Because there was no evidence
that the tape existed, the court held that Zenith could not have acted in
bad faith by failing to procure the tape. Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's judgment. 50 It is interesting to note that the
court of appeals went on to address the merits of the extra-contractual
claims, despite the fact that the workers' compensation claim was previ-
ously resolved against the insured. This might suggest that the court con-
sidered the possibility that extra-contractual liability could exist in the
absence of contractual liability.
4. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Extends Beyond Judgment
Against Insurer
Mid-Century v. Boyte: Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Extends
Beyond Judgment on Insured's UIM Claim
During the Survey period, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that
an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing extends beyond a judg-
ment on its insured's UIM claim in Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v.
Boyte.51 This case arose in 1992 when the insured, Randy Boyte, was in-
48. Id. at *34.
49. Id. at *4 (citing Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 56).




volved in a car accident. Boyte made a claim against his insurer, Mid-
Century, for personal injury protection ("PIP") and also asserted a liabil-
ity claim against the other driver. Boyte filed suit against the other
driver, and her carrier tendered its policy limits of $100,000 to Boyte.
Boyte then added Mid-Century to the underlying lawsuit asserting claims
for UIM benefits.
In 1995 Mid-Century determined that Boyte's UIM claim was worth
$120,000 and tendered $20,000, which was the difference after subtracting
the settlement with the other driver. Because Boyte needed additional
medical treatment, his claims against Mid-Century for the remaining pol-
icy limits proceeded to trial.52 The jury found that Boyte was entitled to
the remaining $80,000 available under the Mid-Century policy, and Mid-
Century appealed the judgment. After the judgment, Boyte informed
Mid-Century that he was in need of back surgery and he could not afford
it.53 Despite the $80,000 judgment for Boyte, Mid-Century only offered
to pay $23,400 for Boyte's back surgery and therapy since the appeal was
pending. Boyte declined this offer, and Mid-Century did not pay the
$80,000 until 1998, after the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment and the Texas Supreme Court denied review.
As a result of Mid-Century's delay in settling his claim, Boyte sued
Mid-Century for bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the
Insurance Code and the DTPA. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury
found that Mid-Century knowingly failed to attempt to effectuate a
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of Boyte's claim when it knew or
should have known that its liability was reasonably clear. Mid-Century
appealed arguing, among other things, that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing does not extend beyond judgment. Specifically, Mid-Century al-
leged that "it and Boyte [were] no longer in an insurer-insured relation-
ship but that they [were] in a judgment debtor-creditor relationship since
Boyte obtained a judgment against Mid-Century. ' 54 In support of its ar-
gument, Mid-Century relied on Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Aiello,55 in
which the Texas Supreme Court held that an insurance company does not
owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing on a claim when the claim has
already been settled by both parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment finding that the facts were distinguishable from
Aiello because the agreed judgment in Aiello was subject to immediate
execution, while the judgment in this case was superseded pending Mid-
52. Mid-Century, 49 S.W.3d at 410.
53. Mid-Century, 2002 WL 1027985, at *1.
54. Mid-Century, 49 S.W.3d at 413.
55. See Mid-Century, 49 S.W.3d at 413 (citing Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941
S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997)). The Aiello case dealt with a policyholder who settled his claim and
entered into an agreed judgment that was not suspended by any appeal and became final.
It was not until the insurer failed to perform according to the judgment that the Aiellos
attempted to assert a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Accord-
ingly, the Texas Supreme Court held that an insurance company did not owe a duty of




On May 23, 2002, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals' holding. In reaching its decision, the Texas Supreme Court held
that the facts in this case were not distinguishable from Aiello. In particu-
lar, the Texas Supreme Court noted that "[l]ike the agreed judgment in
Aiello, Mid-Century's UIM judgment called only for payment of a sum of
money to Boyte. ' '57 The Supreme Court held that the parties' relation-
ship was transformed from one of insurer-insured to judgment creditor-
judgment debtor upon the trial court's entry of judgment.58 The Court
explained that "an insurer's duty of good faith arises because of the dis-
parity in bargaining power inherent in the insurer-insured relationship,"
which "simply [does] not arise in the judgment creditor-judgment
debtor context."'59 The Supreme Court held that Boyte, like the Aiellos,
was not vulnerable because he had access to a number of enforcement
remedies. 60 Thus, the Supreme Court held that Boyte had no bad faith
cause of action based on Mid-Century's post-judgment conduct because
the judgment extinguished Mid-Century's duty of good faith.61
5. Interpleading Funds for Conflicting Claims
First Colony v. Bailey-Mason: Insurer Avoids Bad Faith Claim by Inter-
pleading Funds for Conflicting Claims
First Colony Life Insurance Co. v. Bailey-Mason62 illustrates an in-
surer's effective use of an interpleader action to avoid bad faith claims
when it is presented with conflicting claims. First Colony Life Insurance
Co. ("First Colony") issued a life insurance policy to Edward James Ma-
son, Jr., in the amount of $100,000. In 1999, Mason died as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds. Carlyn Bailey-Mason, the insured's primary
beneficiary under the policy, submitted a claim to First Colony under the
policy. Upon investigating the claim, First Colony learned that the police
department's investigation into the insured's murder was ongoing and
that Bailey-Mason had not been eliminated as a suspect. First Colony
also learned that the insured's divorce from his first wife, Rae Mason,
may never have been finalized. Based on these facts, First Colony filed
an interpleader action, pleading that Bailey-Mason had not been elimi-
nated as a suspect and that her interest as a beneficiary in the Policy
would be forfeited if she had willfully brought about the death of the
insured. First Colony further pleaded that Rae Mason might have a com-
munity property interest in the policy or premiums if she and the insured
never divorced. Both Bailey-Mason and Rae Mason appeared and as-
56. Id.




61. Id. at *3.
62. No. Civ. A. 3:00CV1417M, 2001 WL 705786 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2001, no pet.).
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serted claims for the proceeds of the policy. Bailey-Mason also asserted
counterclaims against First Colony alleging bad faith.63
In evaluating Bailey-Mason's counterclaim, the court noted that in or-
der for Bailey-Mason to prevail on her bad faith claim, she must establish
that First-Colony knew or should have known that it was reasonably clear
that her claim was covered under the Policy. The court further noted that
an insurer is not liable for statutory penalties and attorney fees for inter-
pleading insurance proceeds due to conflicting claims.64 The court also
explained the insurer's liability for interest ceases once it makes an un-
conditional tender of funds. 65 Accordingly, the court held that First Col-
ony was not liable for statutory penalties and attorneys' fees, because it




Balog v. State Farm: Injured Third Party Has No Standing to Assert
Stowers Claim Against Carrier Absent Assignment of Claim from Insured
In Balog v. State Farm Lloyds,66 the El Paso Court of Appeals ad-
dressed whether an injured third party had standing to assert a Stowers
action against an insured's carrier absent an assignment. This case arose
after Kay Balog sustained severe injuries when Mark Mitchell struck her
head with a baseball bat during the course of a robbery. As a result,
Mitchell was convicted for attempted capital murder and was sentenced
to serve six years in prison. Following Mitchell's conviction, Balog filed
suit against Mitchell and his parents. The Mitchells requested that State
Farm provide a defense under their homeowner's policy. State Farm ini-
tially agreed to provide a defense subject to a reservation of rights, but it
later obtained a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend be-
cause the policy excluded intentional conduct from coverage. Balog ob-
tained a judgment against Mitchell in the underlying litigation for $2.72
million.67
Balog then filed suit against State Farm seeking to recover that portion
of the judgment within the policy limits ($300,000). Balog also sought to
recover the amount awarded by the jury in excess of the policy limits
pursuant to the Stowers doctrine for State Farm's refusal of her prior de-
mand to settle for policy limits. State Farm answered and, with the trial
63. Id. at *1.
64. Id. at *4 (citing Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 F.2d 1155, 1163-64 (5th Cir.
1976) and Cable Comm. Network, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 838 S.W.2d 947,
950 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
65. Id. at *4 (citing Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 F.2d 1155, 1163-64 (5th Cir.
1976)).
66. No. 08-00-00324-CV, 2001 WL 997412 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 30, 2001, no pet.
h.) (no publication).
67. Id. at *1.
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court's consent, filed a third-party declaratory judgment action against
Mitchell seeking a determination that it had no duty to indemnify him for
the underlying judgment. Mitchell failed to answer, and the trial court
rendered a default declaratory judgment in favor of State Farm.68 State
Farm then moved for summary judgment against Balog, and the trial
court granted the summary judgment in State Farm's favor.69
On appeal, Balog alleged that State Farm wrongfully refused to settle
her claim against Mitchell. However, State Farm argued that the Stowers
claim must fail because Balog failed to present evidence that she obtained
an assignment of the claim from Mitchell. The court noted that "a claim
that an insurer negligently failed to settle an injured party's action against
an insured belongs to the insured, and the injured party has no standing
to assert it absent an assignment of the claim."'70 The court held that
Balog lacked standing to assert the claim, because she failed to produce
evidence that she had been assigned Mitchell's Stowers claim. Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.71
2. Effect of Bankruptcy
Davis v. Osherow: No Stowers Liability Where Insured's Liability is
Discharged in Bankruptcy Before Judgment Becomes Final
In Davis v. Osherow,72 the Fifth Circuit addressed whether a Stowers
claim exists where the insured is not personally liable for a judgment. In
this case, the insured was involved in an automobile accident that re-
sulted in injuries to David Baker, a passenger in the insured's vehicle.
The Bakers filed suit against the insured, and the insured's automobile
insurance carrier, Safeway Managing General Agency, Inc., provided a
defense for the insured. The Bakers made a settlement demand to
Safeway, but Safeway never responded. Safeway intervened in the litiga-
tion and interpleaded the entire bodily injury limits available under the
insured's policy. The Bakers asserted a Stowers cause of action against
Safeway for negligently failing to settle claims within the policy limits. 73
On the day the trial was set in the underlying tort lawsuit, the insured
filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, and the bankruptcy court
granted the insured's bankruptcy discharge. The Bakers filed a proof of
claim in the bankruptcy case, alleging an unsecured, non-priority claim in
the amount of $2,300,000 for alleged damages arising as a result of the
accident.74 The Bakers' action against the insured was tried on January
68. For discussion of the declaratory judgment, see supra part III.B.3.
69. Balog, No. 08-00-00324-CV, 2001 WL 997412 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 30, 2001,
no pet. h.) (no publication).
70. Id. at *2 (citing Whatley v. City of Dallas, 758 S.W.2d 301, 307 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied)).
71. Id.
72. 253 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2001).
73. Id. at 808.
74. Id. at 809.
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26, 1998, and a verdict was rendered in favor of the insured. The trial
court granted a new trial, and the case was retried. A verdict was eventu-
ally rendered against the insured in the amount of $550,000. After the
first verdict, but before the retrial of the action, Safeway filed an adver-
sary action in the bankruptcy court against the trustee and the Bakers,
seeking a declaratory judgment that no Stowers claim existed in the bank-
ruptcy estate against Safeway. The bankruptcy court tried the adversary
action and a final judgment was entered declaring that a Stowers cause of
action existed and was owned by the bankruptcy estate.75
Safeway appealed to the Fifth Circuit arguing that the bankruptcy court
erred in ruling that a Stowers claim could exist in favor of the estate.
Specifically, Safeway argued that under Texas law, a Stowers claim does
not accrue until a judgment is entered in excess of policy limits, and the
estate had no Stowers claim in this action, because such judgment was not
entered until three years after the insured filed for bankruptcy protection.
Safeway also argued that the insured's bankruptcy discharge nullified any
potential for a Stowers claim or any injury giving rise to a Stowers claim.
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that "a Stowers cause of
action does not accrue until the judgment in the underlying case becomes
final."'76 Thus, the court held that since there was no judgment against
[the insured] until July 27, 1999, more than three years after the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy case, [the insured] could not have had a
Stowers claim against [Safeway] before that date because the "tort was
not complete. '77 In addition, because the insured did not have such a
claim at the time of the commencement of his bankruptcy action, such
claim also could not have been included in the estate. Moreover, the
Court found that the insured's bankruptcy discharge more than two years
prior to the judgment in the Baker's action negated the existence of a
Stowers claim because there was no subsequent harm or legal injury to
the insured because he is no longer personally liable to the Bakers for any
judgment in excess of the amount covered by the insurance policy as a
result of the discharge.78
C. PROMPT PAYMENT ACT (ARTICLE 21.55)
1. No Penalty Absent Liability for Claim
Allstate v. Bonner: No Liability for Penalties for Failing to Timely Ac-
knowledge a Claim Absent Proof of Liability for the Claim
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Bonner,79 the Texas Supreme Court consid-
ered whether an insurer's failure to timely acknowledge a claim entitles
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Street v. Hon. Second Ct. of Apps., 756 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1988)).
77. Davis, 253 F.3d at 810 (quoting Linkerhoger v. Am. Fid. & Cas. Co., 260 S.W.2d
884, 887 (Tex. 1953)).
78. Id. at 810.
79. 51 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. 2001).
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the insured to a penalty under Texas Insurance Code Article 21.55, Sec-
tion 6, even if the insurer was not ultimately liable for the claim
presented. In this case, the insured was injured in an accident caused by
an uninsured motorist. The insured submitted notice for a personal in-
jury protection ("PIP") benefits claim, and Allstate paid $1,619 of the PIP
claim. The insured then made a claim for uninsured motorist ("UM")
benefits claim under the same policy. Allstate failed to acknowledge re-
ceipt of the UM claim within fifteen days and eventually denied the
claim. As a result, the insured sued Allstate to recover the UM benefits
and statutory penalties under Article 21.55 based on Allstate's failure to
timely acknowledge the claim. Although Allstate stipulated that it failed
to timely acknowledge receipt of the demand, it defended the claim based
on the undisputed fact that it had already paid PIP benefits in excess of
the UM claim. 80
The jury found UM damages in an amount less than the PIP payment,
but awarded the insured attorneys' fees under Article 21.55. The trial
court declined to award attorneys' fees based on the non-duplication pro-
vision and rendered a judgment that the insured take nothing. The court
of appeals affirmed the take nothing judgment, but reversed the trial
court's denial of attorney's fees and assessed all costs of court for trial
and appeal against Allstate based on its failure to comply with Article
21.55.81
Allstate appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, arguing that the insured
was not entitled to attorneys' fees, because Article 21.55, section 6, only
penalizes insurers when they fail to acknowledge claims for which they
are liable. Allstate argued that it was not liable for the insured's UM
claim, because the nonduplication-of-benefits provision entitled the in-
sured to UM benefits only if her UM damages exceeded those paid or
payable under the policy's PIP coverage. The court agreed, stating that
Article 21.55 provides a statutory penalty and reasonable attorney's fees
"in all cases where a claim is made pursuant to a policy of insurance and
the insurer liable therefore is not in compliance with [the article]. '82 The
Court further noted that "[t]o successfully maintain a claim under Section
6, a party must establish three elements: (1) a claim under an insurance
policy; (2) that the insurer is liable for the claim; and (3) that the insurer
has failed to follow one or more sections of Article 21.55 with respect to
the claim."' 83 The Texas Supreme Court found that Allstate successfully
defeated the insured's claim and, therefore, the insured failed to establish
the second requirement. As a consequence, the Texas Supreme Court
held that Allstate was not liable for the statutory penalties under 21.55
despite the fact that it failed to comply with Article 21.55.
80. Id. at 290. Allstate defended the claim based on the policy's non-duplication of
benefits provision, which entitled the insured to UM benefits only if the UM damages
exceeded damages paid under the PIP coverage.
81. Id.




2. Severance from Contract Claims
In re Trinity: Court Abused Discretion in Denying Severance of Prompt
Payment Claims from Contract Claim
In In re Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,84 the Seventh Court of Ap-
peals in Amarillo held that prompt payment claims under Texas Insur-
ance Code Article 21.55 must be severed from unadjudicated uninsured/
underinsured motorist claims. This case arose after the insured sustained
fatal injuries in a head on collision with a motorized work over rig owned
and operated by an employee of Premier Well Service, Inc. ("Premier").
After the insureds filed their petition in the underlying action against Pre-
mier and its employee and discovered that the limits of liability insurance
for Premier did not exceed one million dollars, the insureds made a writ-
ten claim for UIM benefits against Trinity Universal Insurance Company
on April 18, 2000.85
The insureds then joined Trinity as a defendant and asserted several
claims pursuant to the policy, including claims under the UIM endorse-
ment, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and Article 21.55 of the In-
surance Code. The insureds eventually settled and dismissed their claims
against Premier and the operator of its equipment. Trinity filed a motion
for severance and abatement, which the trial court partially granted. The
trial court severed the bad faith and Article 21.21 claims, but denied sev-
erance of the Article 21.55 claim. Trinity then sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the trial judge to grant its motion for severance regarding the
Article 21.55 claim.86
Trinity asserted two grounds in support for the severance. First, Trinity
argued that the UIM claim should have been severed from the extra-
contractual claims "because evidence of settlement negotiations and in-
surance policy limits may be relevant to the extra-contractual claims but
is not admissible as to the UIM claims."' 87 Second, Trinity argued that it
"should not be required to undergo the expense of discovery as to the
extra-contractual claims, when there is a substantial possibility that the
damages awarded in the contract claim will not exceed the limit of the
tortfeasor's policy, and thus will not even trigger the UIM endorsement,
which would preclude any necessity to discover or litigate the extra-con-
tractual claims. ''88 The court found that the claim for damages under Ar-
ticle 21.55 was severable, because (1) the claim for UIM benefits was
contractual and the claim for penalties under 21.55 controversy involves
more than one cause of action, (2) the severed claim was one that would
be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the
84. No. 07-01-0377-CV, 2001 WL 1338798 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Oct. 30, 2001, orig.
proceeding).
85. Id. at *1.
86. Id.




Article 21.55 claim is not so interwoven with the tort action and contract
action that they involve the same facts and issues.89 The court further
found that Trinity had no adequate remedy at law. Accordingly, the
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the sever-
ance and granted the petition for writ of mandamus requiring the trial
court to grant the motion to sever the Article 21.55 claim from the con-
tract claim.
3. Insurer's Innocent Mistake Results in Penalties
American National v. Patty: Insurer's Misunderstanding of Law Results
in Statutory Penalties
American National Property & Casualty Co. v. Patty90 illustrates how
an insurer's mistake can result in penalties under Article 21.55. In this
case, the insureds executed a "Bill of Sale" to sell their home to buyers
for $28,000. After making several payments, the buyers notified the in-
sureds that they no longer wished to buy the home, ceased making pay-
ments, and returned the keys. Approximately two weeks later, a fire
completely destroyed the home. The insureds made a claim on their
property insurance issued by American National. Because the policy
contained a provision limiting its liability to the policyholder's interest in
the property, American National offered to pay the insureds only
$12,000, which was the amount the buyers owed on the home. The in-
sureds rejected the offer, contending that they were entitled to the full
policy limits of $75,300. American National filed a declaratory judgment
action, and the insureds counter-claimed for a declaration that American
National owed policy limits, as well as damages for violations of the In-
surance Code. The trial court ruled that the Bill of Sale was a contract
for deed that the buyers had repudiated before the fire. Therefore, the
trial court held that the insureds were entitled to the policy limit of
$75,300, less the deductible, and awarded the insureds statutory penalties
under Article 21.55.
At trial and on appeal, American National argued that the insureds
were not full owners of the property but were mortgagees, and that
$12,000 was the extent of their insurable interest. The Dallas Court of
Appeals disagreed finding that the Bill of Sale was executory in nature,
setting out future obligations, and was a contract for deed. The court
found that the buyers had rescinded the contract of sale when they re-
turned the keys to the insureds and, therefore, any interest the buyers
had in the property was extinguished at that time. The court affirmed the
trial court's holding that the insureds were entitled to the policy limits less
their deductible. The court also held that American National was liable
for penalties under Article 21.55 as a result of its delay in making pay-
89. In re Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 2001 WL 1338798, at *4.








During 2001, several Texas courts addressed whether third party claims
against insureds involved "occurrences" under the respective commercial
general liability policies at issue. The courts struggled with construing the
definition of "occurrence" in general liability policies in the context of
construction defect cases. Several cases determined that damages result-
ing from a builder's substandard construction or failure to comply with
specifications were the natural and probable consequence of the builder's
intentional acts and, therefore, did not constitute an "occurrence." On
the other hand, at least one case held that damages resulting from a
builder's failure to construct a home in a good and workmanlike manner
arose from the builder's negligence and did constitute an "occurrence."
Although these opinions appear to reach inconsistent results, the reason-
ing applied appears to be consistent with the principle explained in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Harken Exploration Co. v.
Sphere Drake Insurance PLC, which is discussed below. Thus, despite
the differing outcomes, the decisions are not necessarily in conflict.
Harken v. Sphere Drake: Property Damage and Pollution Arising from
Operation of Oil Facility Deemed to Constitute an "Occurrence" Trigger-
ing Coverage
In Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC,92 the Fifth Cir-
cuit addressed whether pollution claims against an insured constituted an
"occurrence" within the meaning of the insured's liability policies. The
insured in this case purchased and commenced oil and gas operations on
an oil and gas lease. The owners of a nearby ranch, the Rices, sued the
insured in federal court alleging causes of action for breach of the lease,
breach of the pipeline easement, negligence, and violation of the Oil Pol-
lution Act. The insured asked its insurer, The Sphere Drake Insurance
Company ("Sphere"), to defend it in the lawsuit under its commercial
general liability policy, and Sphere refused to provide a defense. The in-
sured filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Sphere
had a duty to defend it in the federal lawsuit. The Rices' claim under the
Oil Pollution Act was eventually dismissed and the state law claims were
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Rices then sued the insured in
state court alleging the same state law claims. In the declaratory judg-
91. Id. at *4. The court, however, noted that interest had been calculated incorrectly
and reformed the judgment to reflect the proper interest calculation.
92. 261 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. Tex. 2001).
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ment action against Sphere, the court found in favor of the insured. 93
In determining whether Sphere had a duty to defend, the Fifth Circuit
first looked to whether the Rices had alleged an occurrence within the
policy. The court noted that the policies defined occurrence as "an acci-
dent, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which re-
suits in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured. '94 Because the policies did not define
"accident," the court considered the general rules cited by the Texas Su-
preme Court and the Fifth Circuit:
The Texas Supreme Court has told us that there is not an accident
when the action is intentionally taken and performed in such a man-
ner that it is an intentional tort, regardless of whether the effect was
unintended or unexpected .... We also know, however, that there is
an accident when the action is intentionally taken, but is performed
negligently, and the effect is not what would have been intended or
expected had the action been performed non-negligently .. . . In
other words, if the act is deliberately taken, performed negligently, and
the effect is not the intended or expected result had the deliberate act
been performed non-negligently, there is an accident.95
The Fifth Circuit noted the Rices alleged that (1) the lines, tanks, and
wells on the property subject to the lease had ruptured, leaked and over-
flowed and continued to do so; (2) the pollutants released had contami-
nated the ranch and damaged plant and animal life; and (3) the insured
negligently, carelessly, and wrongfully polluted the ranch and acted mali-
ciously with intent and awareness that its actions would cause property
damage. 96 Applying the general rules to the facts, the Fifth Circuit found
that the Rices alleged an accident, which would constitute an occurrence
under the policies. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held that "the operation
of the oil facilities is the action deliberately taken, but alleged to have
been performed negligently," and the damage to plant and animal life
caused by the pollutants was "the unintended and unexpected effects of
the non-negligent operation of an oil facility. '97
Malone v. Scottsdale: Damages Resulting from Builder's Failure to Con-
struct Home in Compliance with Warranties and Architect's Specifications
Do Not Constitute an "Occurrence"
In Malone v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.,98 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that a contractor's failure to
construct improvements in accordance with the architect's plans and
specifications was not an "occurrence." The insured, Malone Construc-
tion Company ("Malone"), contracted with a partnership to construct
93. Id. at 470.
94. Id. at 472.
95. Id. at 472-73 (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Harken Exploration Co., 261 F.3d at 474.
98. 147 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
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commercial improvements to an office and warehouse complex in Con-
roe, Texas. The partnership then sued Malone alleging negligent con-
struction of improvements to real property. In support of its claim, the
partnership set forth an extensive list of Malone's failures to properly
construct the improvements, naming over forty defects in Malone's work.
The trial court eventually entered judgment against Malone for $178,909
in actual damages, $75,000 in attorney's fees and $72,249 in pre-judgment
interest, in addition to post-judgment interest and costs of court. 99
At the time of the lawsuit, Malone was insured under a commercial
general liability policy issued by Scottsdale. The Policy contained several
exclusions for property damage caused by faulty workmanship. Malone
sought a defense under the Scottsdale policy, and Scottsdale denied cov-
erage. Malone sued Scottsdale seeking the costs of his defense and in-
demnity in the underlying lawsuit. Scottsdale moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the property damage was not caused by an
"occurrence" as that term was defined in the policy.' 00
In addressing whether the claim constituted an "occurrence," the court
first looked to the policy. The policy defined an "occurrence" as "an acci-
dent, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions."101 The court noted that under Texas law, an
injury is accidental if "from the viewpoint of the insured, [it is] not the
natural and probable consequence of the action or occurrence which pro-
duced the injury.' 0 2 The court then looked to a sister court's decision
addressing whether a builder's failure to comply with implied warranties
constituted an occurrence under a similar policy. The court noted that in
Hartrick v. Great American Lloyds Ins. Co., the Houston Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the builder's "[lack of compliance with implied war-
ranties, i.e., promises implied as a matter of law, are not accidental, but
resulted from not doing what one must do." 0 3 Thus, the Hartrick court
held that when "an injury results from voluntary and intentional conduct,
here, not preparing the soil and not constructing the foundation in keep-
ing with the promises implied on [the builder] by law, the injury is not an
'accident' and, therefore, not an 'occurrence." ' 10 4
The court noted that the petition alleged that Malone "failed to con-
struct improvements in accordance with the architect's plans and specifi-
cations"' 0 5 that were approved by the city. Relying on Hartrick, the court
concluded that "these failures were omissions that can only be considered
99. Id. at 626.
100. Id. at 627. Scottsdale also argued that the policy contained several exclusions for
property damage caused by the insured's faulty workmanship.
101. Id. at 627.
102. Id. at 627 (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.
1999)).
103. Id. at 628 (citing Hartrick v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 62 S.W.3d 270 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2000, no writ)).
104. Id. at 627 (citing Hartrick, 62 S.W.3d at 277)).
105. Malone, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
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voluntary and intentional, as opposed to accidental. ' 10 6 The court opined
that "By not doing what it had to do, [the builder] could reasonably antic-
ipate injury to [the plaintiffs.] ' 10 7 The court further held that the fact that
the petition alleged "negligent" construction of improvements to real
property did not alter its conclusion. Accordingly, the court held Malone
was not entitled to coverage, because there was no "occurrence" under
the policy.10 8
Devoe v. Great American: Damages from Builder's Defective Construc-
tion Arose From Intentional Act and Do Not Constitute an Occurrence.
In Devoe v. Great American Insurance,10 9 the Austin Court of Appeals
applied a similar interpretation of the term "occurrence." The Devoes
sued their homebuilder, Tri-Mark, for defective construction alleging
breach of contract and violations of the DTPA. Tri-Mark requested that
Great American defend and indemnify it under its CGL policy, and
Great American declined to defend. Tri-Mark failed to appear for trial,
and the court granted a default judgment against Tri-Mark "for actual
damages of $216,035.13, attorney's fees in the amount of $27,173.23, and
post-judgment interest." Tri-Mark failed to satisfy the judgment, and the
Devoes sued Great American, seeking recovery as third-party benefi-
ciaries under the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Great American. 110
The issue on appeal was whether the claim alleged an "occurrence"
under the Policy. In addressing this point, the Austin Court of Appeals
stated:
A review of the Devoes' claim for relief did not turn on any alleged
"occurrence" as required by the Policy. In applying the eight-corners
test to this case, the Devoes' allegations must state a claim that is
potentially within the coverage of the Policy. The damages com-
plained of by the Devoes concentrate on Tri-Mark's defective con-
struction. While the Devoes' allegations are to be liberally
construed, we are not obligated to imagine factual scenarios that
could potentially bring the claim within the policy limits .... They do
not allege any event or series of events that could be construed as an
accident. The Devoes' home was constructed over a period of time
as a voluntary and intentional act by the insured, and the alleged
deficient and substandard construction did not constitute an accident
or an occurrence under the plain-meaning rule even if the resulting,
poorly constructed home was unexpected, unforeseen, or unintended
by the insured."'
106. Id.
107. Id. at 628 (citing Hartrick, 62 S.W.3d at 278)).
108. Malone, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
109. 50 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no. pet.).
110. Id. at 569.
111. Id. at 572 (citations omitted).
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The court concluded that the allegations in the pleadings did not allege
an "occurrence" that would trigger Great American's duty to defend
under the policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment
in favor of Great American. 112 At first glance, this holding appears to be
inconsistent with the holding in Hartrick because the builder did not ex-
pect, foresee, or intend the damage to the home. However, since the re-
sulting damage was the natural and probable consequence of the
builder's intentional and voluntary failure to construct the improvements
in accordance with the architect's plans and specifications, the decision
follows the principles articulated in Harken, Hartrick and Malone.
First Texas Homes v. Mid-Continent: Builder's Liability for Failure to
Construct Home in Good and Workmanlike Manner Deemed to be Acci-
dental Occurrence Triggering Coverage.
On the other hand, in First Texas Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casu-
alty Co.,113 a Texas federal court held that allegations of negligent work-
manship were broad enough to allege an "occurrence," thereby giving
rise to the duty to defend. In this case, a homeowner sued his builder,
First Texas, alleging that the home was not constructed in a good and
workmanlike manner and that the foundation was insufficient. First
Texas' insurer, Mid-Continent Casualty Company, refused to provide a
defense on the grounds that the petition did not allege an occurrence
under the policy. "First Texas then filed [a] declaratory judgment action
to determine the respective rights and duties of the parties under the
policy. "114
The issue in the declaratory judgment action was whether the insurer
had a duty to defend First Texas in the underlying litigation. The policy
defined "occurrence" to mean "an accident, including continuous or re-
peated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."' "15
The court noted that "[c]ourts have interpreted the term 'accident' in this
context to include damage that is the 'unexpected, unforeseen or unde-
signed happening or consequence of an insured's negligent behavior."'116
The court then looked to a Fifth Circuit decision holding that "defective
performance or faulty workmanship by the insured that injures the prop-
erty of a third party is 'accidental under this definition."" 17 The court
noted that "a builder who failed to abide by the specifications of a con-
tract, for example by substituting a weaker building material, may, by
that breach, produce expected property damage to his or her work, and
112. Id.
113. No. 3-00-CV-1048-BD, 2001 WL 238112 (N.D. Tex. March 7, 2001).
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *2 (citing Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grapevine Excavation, Inc., 197 F.3d
720, 725 (5th Cir. 1999)) (other citations omitted) (emphasis added).
117. First Tex. Homes, Inc., 2001 WL 238112, at *2 (citing Hartford Cas. Co. v. Cruse,
938 F.2d 601, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1991)) (other citations omitted).
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may thus fail to show a covered 'occurrence."'' u 8 The court explained
that "the relevant inquiry is not whether the insured damaged his own
work, but whether the resulting injury or damage was unexpected and
unintended."11 9
In this case, the petition alleged that the home was "not of proper qual-
ity and was not designed or constructed in a good and workmanlike man-
ner and that the foundation was insufficient and resulted in a foundation
and home that were not properly designed or built.' 20 The court noted
that the allegations were broad and any doubts about whether the peti-
tion alleged a covered cause of action must be resolved in favor of the
insured. Thus, the court concluded that the broad allegations could be
construed to support a claim that the damages were neither expected nor
intended by First Texas. Accordingly, the court held that the petition al-
leged an "occurrence" and that Mid-Continent had a duty to defend.
While this decision appears to be in conflict with the previously cited
cases, it is important to note that this case was a duty to defend case and
the court broadly construed the allegations in favor of the insured. Fur-
thermore, this case illustrates the principle articulated in Harken, "that
there is an accident when the action is intentionally taken, but is per-
formed negligently, and the effect is not what would have been intended
or expected if the action had been performed non-negligently.' 21 Thus,
since there were no allegations indicating that the insured expected or
intended the damage or that the damages were the natural and probable
result of the insured's intentional conduct, this decision arguably can be
reconciled with the other construction cases discussed above.
Martin v. St. Paul: Water User Deemed to be Aware of Impact of Diver-
sion on Downstream Users; Therefore, Liability for Deprivation to Other
Users Does not Constitute Covered "Accident"
In Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, Ltd. v. St. Paul Guardian Insur-
ance Co.,122 a Texas federal court addressed whether the intentional di-
version of water triggers coverage under a general liability policy. This
case arose when the insured, an upstream facility, "diverted [a] creek to
dredge, wash, and screen sand and gravel for on-site construction" with-
out a permit. As a result, Trinity Materials, Inc. ("Trinity"), a down-
stream facility holding senior water rights, sued the insured alleging that
the insured "deprived Trinity of water, which it needed to operate." Trin-
ity asserted that the insured's diversion caused production and sales
losses exceeding $150,000. The insured filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion against its insurer seeking a declaration that Trinity had a duty to
118. Id. at *3 (emphasis removed).
119. Id. (citing Cruse, 938 F.2d at 604-05).
120. Id. at *3.
121. Harken Exploration Co., 2001 WL 868275, at *3 (citation omitted).
122. 145 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
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defend and to indemnify the underlying lawsuit. 123
The policy in question provided coverage for a covered "event," which
was defined to be "an accident, including continuous or repeated expo-
sure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." 124 The in-
sured argued that "Trinity's allegation that [it] negligently diverted the
waters of the creek relied upon an underlying legal theory of negligence,
thus triggering [the insurer's] duty to defend." The court rejected this
argument, noting that it is the facts giving rise to the alleged actionable
conduct rather than the cause of action alleged that determines coverage.
The court found that the insured purposefully impounded the creek to
screen and dredge construction materials. Thus, despite the allegations,
"the acts ultimately leading to the underlying lawsuit were intentional,
not negligent."'1 25
The insured further argued that the injury to Trinity triggered coverage
because the insured never intended to injure Trinity. In addressing this
argument, the court noted that the Texas Supreme Court has instructed
courts to look at "both the actor's intent and the reasonably foreseeable
effect of his conduct."' 26 Under this test, the court noted that "an injury
is accidental if from the viewpoint of the insured, [it is] not the natural
and probable consequence of the action or occurrence which produced
the injury; or in other words, if the injury could not reasonably be antici-
pated by the insured, or would not ordinarily follow from the action or
occurrence which caused the injury.' 27 The court further noted that "the
law does not require foresight of specific details before a court may find
that these injuries were not accidental.' 128 Rather, the court held that
public policy compelled a finding that the existing water permit system
provided sufficient notice to upstream users that "their actions have natu-
ral and probable downstream impacts.' 29
Applying these principles, the court held that the incident prompting
the lawsuit was the insured's intentional act in diverting water. Since the
injuries naturally and foreseeably resulted from the insured's diversion of
the creek, the court concluded that the damages did not constitute a cov-
ered "event" and, therefore, the insurer had no duty to defend.
2. Insured's Recovery of Money Withheld Under Contract
Acceptance v. S&S: Insured Is Entitled to Recover from Insurer Money
Withheld By Third Party Under a Contract to Compensate Third Party for
the Insured's Negligence
123. Id. at 796.
124. Id. at 797.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citation omitted ).
127. Martin Marietta, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 798.




In Acceptance Ins. Co. v. S&S Telecom, Inc.,130 the 285th Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Bexar County addressed whether an insured's negligence in
damaging phone equipment which resulted in the insured receiving an
offset of payment constituted an "occurrence," thereby triggering cover-
age. In this case, the insured entered into several service contracts with
Southwestern Bell ("SWB") to remove telephone equipment from
SWB's facility. The insured's employees damaged SWB's equipment dur-
ing the removal, and SWB demanded that the insured pay $66,004 to re-
pair the damaged equipment. The insured filed a claim with its insurer
seeking coverage for the loss, and the insurer denied coverage. After the
insured failed to pay SWB for the damaged equipment, SWB withheld
$66,004 from its payment to the insured under the service contracts. The
insured filed suit against SWB for breach of the service contract by with-
holding payments, and the trial court held that SWB did not breach the
contract, because the insured negligently damaged SWB's equipment.131
The insured then sued its insurer alleging that it breached the policy by
denying the claim. The insured sought to recover the amount withheld by
SWB, plus attorney's fees expended in pursuing its breach of contract
claim against SWB and attorney's fees expended in the coverage action.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insured.
At trial and on appeal, the insurer argued that there was no coverage
because SWB's withholding of repair costs did not constitute an "occur-
rence." In addressing this point, the court of appeals looked to the facts
underlying the insured's alleged liability. In particular, the court evalu-
ated the insured's actions leading to SWB's injury, rather than SWB's
reaction to the injury. The court found that the insured negligently dam-
aged SWB's equipment, thereby causing damage to SWB in the amount
of $66,004. Accordingly, since the insured's liability arose from its negli-
gence, the court held that the policy provided coverage for the loss. 132
The insurer also challenged the insured's award of attorney's fees in
both the underlying and coverage actions. In addressing the recovery of
attorneys' fees in the underlying action, the court of appeals noted that if
the converse of this case had occurred, that is, if SWB had sued the in-
sured, then the insured would be able to collect attorney's fees incurred
in defending itself in the underlying lawsuit because the duty to defend
would have been triggered. The court noted, however, that this case
could be distinguished because the insured was not forced to defend itself
in a suit brought by SWB. Instead, the insured "took affirmative action
to sue SWB for withholding payment." The court noted that there was
no provision in the insurance contract providing coverage for legal fees
incurred when the insured chooses to sue third parties. Accordingly, the
court overruled the award of attorney's fees in the underlying action. On
130. No. 04-00-00634-CV, 2001 WL 844749 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, July 25,
2001).
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id. at *2.
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the other hand, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's award of
attorney's fees incurred in the coverage action finding that the insurer
had breached the contract and, therefore, the insured was entitled to re-
cover fees incurred in pursuing the coverage action under Section 38.001
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 133
3. Fortuity Doctrine
Scottsdale v. Travis: Lack of Fortuity Negates Duty to Defend
Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Travis,1 34 illustrates the application of
the fortuity doctrine to negate coverage. In this case, the insured, Rich-
ard Robinson, resigned from his position as manager of Maintenance
Houston in 1993 and set up a competing janitorial business called South
Texas. The insured's former employer then sued Robinson and South
Texas alleging that Robinson recruited its employees and customers,
made false accusations and began spreading ill-will among its customers,
and used his knowledge of its customer lists and secrets to steal business
for his new company. In its petition, Maintenance alleged causes of ac-
tion against the insureds for misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious
interference with contracts, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, all
arising from the insured's conduct in leaving Maintenance and starting
South Texas.
The insureds demanded a defense in the underlying lawsuit from their
insurer, Scottsdale Insurance Company, pursuant to their primary and ex-
cess insurance policies, which became effective on August 9, 1993. Scotts-
dale filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that it did not owe a
duty to defend, and the insureds counterclaimed. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the district court found that Scottsdale owed a duty
to defend. Therefore, "[t]he trial court entered judgment ordering Scotts-
dale to tender a defense and awarding [the insureds'] attorney's fees in-
curred in the underlying litigation as well as the coverage action. 135
On appeal, Scottsdale argued that there was no duty to defend because
the alleged offenses occurred prior to "the inception of the coverage and
[were], therefore, excluded as a matter of law by both the policy and the
fortuity doctrine."' 136 In support of its argument, Scottsdale pointed "to a
provision in the policy providing that coverage was triggered only if the
offense was committed during the policy period." Additionally, Scotts-
dale argued that the fortuity doctrine precluded coverage for offenses be-
cause they were committed before the policy period. The fortuity
doctrine precludes coverage for both a "known loss" or a "loss in pro-
gress." "A 'known loss' is a loss the insured knew had occurred prior to
133. Id. at *2-3.
134. No. 05-99-01831-CV, 2001 WL 569300 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 29, 2001, rehearing
denied).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id. at *2.
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making the insurance contract. '137 "A 'loss in progress' occurs when the
insured is, or should be, aware of an ongoing progressive loss at the time
the policy is purchased. '138 The insured, however, attempted to argue
that the fortuity doctrine did not apply because "no liability had been
established and no actual loss had occurred before the inception of the
policy."'1 39 Specifically, the insured contended that even though the alle-
gations pertained to his conduct before the inception of the policy and
before he formed a competing business, he did not use the information
until after South Texas was formed and the policy was in effect. He con-
tended that Maintenance was not injured until he used the information
and, therefore, Maintenance's cause of action did not accrue until after
the policy incepted.
The Dallas Court of Appeals was not persuaded by the insured's argu-
ments. Rather, the court noted that the key question was "whether the
wrongdoing occurred before or after the purchase of the insurance. ' 140
The court stated that the fortuity doctrine "has its roots in the prevention
of fraud; because insurance policies are designed to insure against fortui-
ties, fraud occurs when a policy is misused to insure a certainty.' 41 The
court applied the eight corners rule and determined that the pleadings
alleged a loss in progress. Specifically, the court noted that all of the
allegations pertained to the insured's conduct before the inception of the
insurance policy, and even before South Texas was formed as a corpora-
tion. The court concluded that the purpose behind the fortuity doctrine
applied to this case, because the insured attempted to purchase insurance
against the consequences of his own ongoing wrongful conduct. Thus,
since the petition alleged that the wrongdoing began before the policy
was purchased, the court held that coverage was excluded under both the
specific terms of the insurance policy and the fortuity doctrine as a "loss
in progress." As a result, the court reversed the trial court's judgment
and rendered judgment that Scottsdale had no duty to defend. 142
B. HOMEOWNER'S POLICIES
1. Concurrent Causes Doctrine
State Farm v. Kaip: Where Covered and Non-covered Perils Combine to
Create a Loss, Insured is Entitled to Recover Only Portion of Damages
Which the Insured Establishes Are Caused by the Covered Peril
137. Id. (citing Burch v. Commonwealth Mut. Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Tex.
1970)).
138. Travis, 2001 WL 569300, at *2 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d
495, 502 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ)).
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *2 (citing Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.,
997 F.2d 173, 175-77 (6th Cir. 1993)).
142. Id. at *5.
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In State Farm Lloyds v. Kaip,143 the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed
the difficult burden a plaintiff must overcome in concurrent causation
cases. Sharon Kaip, the insured, sustained damage to her roof following a
hailstorm. Kaip made a claim under her homeowners' policy, and her
insurer, State Farm, sent several adjusters to inspect the roof. The adjust-
ers concluded that only one shingle was damaged by hail, and the rest of
the damage on the roof was due to deterioration that was not covered by
the policy. As a result, State Farm offered to pay Kaip for only the one
shingle that contained possible hail damage minus her deductible. Kaip
eventually "had her roof replaced at her own cost, and sued State Farm
for breach of its homeowner's policy, breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, and violations of the Insurance Code and the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act.' 44
At trial, State Farm's expert testified that the damage was not caused
by hail but was caused by an inherent defect in the type of shingle used
and ordinary wear and tear and deterioration. Kaip's expert acknowl-
edged that there were other causes of the damage to the roof, including
defects in the shingles, the way the shingles were laid out, normal deterio-
ration, and normal wear and tear; however, he testified that the catalyst
of the deterioration was the hail. Kaip's expert further admitted that it
would be difficult to quantify the causes. The jury found that Kaip's roof
was damaged because of a loss under the Policy and that State Farm
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, the trial court
entered judgment against State Farm. 145
On appeal, State Farm argued that the evidence at trial established that
Kaip's roof had to be replaced because of a combination of causes, some
excluded and some covered. Thus, State Farm argued that Kaip failed to
meet her burden of proof under the doctrine of concurrent causes by es-
tablishing which portion of her claim was covered. In addressing this is-
sue, the court of appeals concluded that the admission by Kaip's expert
that hail, wear and tear, deterioration, inherent defect, rain, and the way
the shingles were laid all contributed to the damage to the roof raised the
issue of concurrent causation. The court noted that "under the doctrine
of concurrent causes, where covered and non-covered perils combine to
create the loss, the insured is entitled to recover only that portion of the
damage caused solely by the covered peril. ' 146 The court found that Kaip
failed to meet her burden of proof because Kaip did not attempt to deter-
mine the amount of loss caused by the hail and to secure a jury finding on
the amount of damage attributable to hail. Accordingly the court of ap-
peals held that there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that
Kaip's entire roof had to be replaced because of a loss under the Policy.
143. No. 05-99-01363-CV, 2001 WL 670497 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 15, 2001, pet.
denied).
144. Id. at *1.
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id. at *2 (citing Travelers Indemnity Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.
1971)) (other citations omitted).
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The court also held that State Farm's liability on the contract never be-
came reasonably clear because a bona fide dispute existed as to the cause
of the damage to Kaip's roof. Therefore, the court held that State Farm
was not liable for common law or statutory bad faith.147
2. "Ensuing Loss"
Harrison v. U.S.A.A.: Loss Caused by Rotting Resulting from Water
Damage Does Not Constitute Ensuing Loss and is Therefore Excluded by
Exclusion (f) of Homeowners' Policy
In Harrison v. U.S.A.A. Insurance Co.,148 the Austin Court of Appeals
addressed whether the "ensuing loss" provision of a homeowners' policy
provided coverage for rot caused by water damage. This case arose after
a homeowner noticed that the caulking between her bathtub and the tile
had deteriorated, allowing water from the shower to seep through the
caulking to the surrounding wooden structure, and causing it to rot. The
homeowner replaced the sheetrock, floor joists, and beams that had rot-
ted, as well as wall tile and flooring in the bathroom that was supported
by rotted wood, and sought coverage from USAA under her home-
owner's insurance policy. USAA denied the claim on the grounds that
the loss was caused by rot and was, therefore, excluded by exclusion
(f).14 9 As a result, the homeowner filed suit alleging breach of contract,
breach of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Insurance
Code. USAA moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted
summary judgment without stating its grounds.
On appeal, the homeowner challenged the summary judgment on her
breach of contract claim arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the
legal effect of two provisions in the policy: (1) the ensuing loss provision,
and (2) the exclusion repeal provision. First, the homeowner argued that
the ensuing loss provision provided coverage for her property damage.
The court rejected the homeowners' argument noting that the argument
reverses the causation required by that exception. The court stated that:
[t]o qualify for the exception, ensuing water damage must follow
from one of the types of damage enumerated in exclusion (f). In
other words, the ensuing loss provision covers water damage that re-
sults from, rather than causes, rotting. Applying this principle to the
facts, the Court noted that the event causing the loss was the rotting
of the wood surrounding the bathtub. The Court further noted that,
assuming that the leaking water into the wood constituted water
damage, the leaking preceded, rather than followed, the [home-
147. Id. at *5.
148. No. 03-00-00362-CV, 2001 WL 391539 (Tex. App.-Austin April 19, 2001).
149. Id. at *2. Exclusion (f) excluded coverage for loss caused by: (1) wear and tear,
deterioration or loss caused by any quality in property that causes it to damage or destroy
itself, and (2) rust, rot, mold or other fungi. However, the policy expressly reinstates cov-





Therefore, the court held that the ensuing loss provision did not extend
coverage.15'
In her second point, the homeowner argued that the exclusion repeal
provision overrides exclusion (f).15 2 Specifically, the homeowner at-
tempted to argue that the loss resulted from a leak in a plumbing system
and, therefore, the exclusion did not apply. In addressing this argument,
the court noted that the term "plumbing system" was not defined in the
policy so it must be given its ordinary and generally accepted meaning.
The court then stated that when Texas courts consider plumbing claims
under clauses similar to the instant provision, these claims almost exclu-
sively involve water escaping from pipes located within the unseen inter-
nal structure of the home. Thus, the court concluded that leaking of
water through the caulking was not an accidental discharge of water from
within the plumbing system. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment in favor of the insurer.153
Harrison follows the line of Texas cases holding that the ensuing loss
provision of homeowners' policies covers water damage that results from,
rather than causes, one of the types of damage enumerated in exclusion
(f), such as rust, rot, mold or fungi. While this appears to be the majority
view adopted by Texas Appellate Courts, at least one Texas Appellate
Court has reversed the causation. In Home Insurance Co. v. McClain,'154
the Dallas Court of Appeals adopted a similar argument to the one made
by the homeowner in Harrison. In McClain, the Dallas Court of Appeals
held that to be an ensuing loss caused by water damage, the mold and
fungi would necessarily have to follow the water damage. Finding that
the mold and fungi resulted from water damage, the McClain Court held
that the loss constituted an ensuing loss and was covered. Given the con-
flicting interpretations of the ensuing loss provision by Texas Appellate
Courts and the increase in black mold cases in Texas which will inevitably
turn on this provision, it appears that this issue is ripe for the Texas Su-
preme Court.
3. Declaratory Judgment Against Insured Was Binding on Third Party
Claimant
Balog v. State Farm: Insurer's Declaratory Judgment of No Duty to In-
demnify Held to Be Binding on Injured Third Party
150. Id. at *2 (citing Lambros v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 138, 139-40 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at *2-3. The exclusion repeal provides that exclusions L.a through 1.h do not
apply to loss caused by accidental discharge, leakage or overflow of water of steam from
within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system or household appliance.
153. Harrison, 2001 WL 391539, at *3.




In Balog v. State Farm Lloyds,155 Kay.Balog filed a civil action against
the insured after the insured attacked her during a robbery. The insured
requested State Farm, its homeowner's carrier, to provide a defense, and
State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action. State Farm received a
declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend because the policy
excluded intentional conduct from coverage. Balog eventually obtained a
judgment against the insured for $2.72 million. Balog then sued State
Farm seeking "to recover that portion of the judgment within the policy
limits ($300,000), as well as the amount awarded by the jury in excess of
the policy limits."'1 56 State Farm filed a third-party declaratory judgment
action against the insured seeking a determination that it had no duty to
indemnify the insured for the underlying judgment. State Farm did not
assert a claim for declaratory relief against Balog. The insured did not
answer, and the trial court entered a default declaratory judgment in
favor of State Farm. State Farm moved for summary judgment against
Balog, and the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment.157
A key issue on appeal was whether the declaratory judgment that State
Farm had no duty to indemnify was binding on Balog. In its motion for
summary judgment and on appeal, State Farm argued that Balog could
not recover as a judgment creditor because State Farm had received a
declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify in the same action.
In addressing this issue, the El Paso Court of Appeals noted that the in-
sured is a third party beneficiary of a liability insurance policy. 158 How-
ever, the court noted that the injured party may only proceed against the
insurer "once it has been established by judgment or agreement that the
insured has a legal obligation to pay damages to the injured party. 1 59
The court also looked to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Dairy-
land County Mutual Insurance Co. of Texas v. Childress.160 In Dairyland,
the Texas Supreme Court held "that the insured and the injured party are
not in privity with regard to a declaratory judgment action brought by the
insurer to determine coverage rights prior to the adjudication of the un-
derlying claim by the injured party against the insured."'161 Rather, the
injured party, "as a third-party beneficiary of the liability insurance con-
tract, has rights which may not be precluded by the prior action solely
between the insured and the insurer.' 62 The court of appeals noted that
"pursuant to Dairyland, the first declaratory judgment regarding the duty
to defend would not be binding on Balog since she was not a party to that
155. No. 08-00-00324-CV, 2001 WL 997412 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso Aug. 30, 2001).
156. Id. at *1.
157. Id. at *1.
158. Id. at *3 (citing State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas v. Ollis, 768 S.W.2d 722,
723 (Tex. 1989)).
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770
(Tex. 1983)).





In distinguishing this case from Dairyland, the court of appeals noted
that State Farm filed its second declaratory petition for declaratory judg-
ment related to the indemnification issue after Balog had obtained a
judgment against the insured. The court further noted that the declara-
tory judgment action was filed in the instant case, and State Farm served
Balog's counsel with a copy of the petition. Consequently, the court held
that Dairyland was inapplicable to the second declaratory judgment.
Thus, the court of appeals held that the trial court's determination that
State Farm had no duty to indemnify the insured was binding on Balog
since it was made in the same proceeding. Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment. 164
4. Use of Extrinsic Evidence in Determining Duty to Defend
National General v. Hunter: Court Considers Extrinsic Evidence in De-
termining Duty to Defend Under Homeowner's Policy
When determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend a lawsuit
against the insured, Texas law applies the "eight corners test.' 165 Under
this test, "the allegations made in the underlying complaint are compared
with the terms of the insurance policy, and if any allegations fall within its
coverage, a duty to defend arises."' 166 The duty to defend is unaffected by
facts ascertained before suit, developed in trial, or by the ultimate out-
come of the case.167 The duty to defend is broader than the duty to in-
demnify. Thus, "if an insurer has no duty to defend a specific lawsuit, it
likewise bears no duty to indemnify the insured against any resulting ad-
verse judgment."168
National General Ins. Co. v. Hunter169 provides an example of a situa-
tion where a Texas federal court looked to extrinsic evidence in determin-
ing the existence of a duty to defend. The insureds in that case owned
two separate residences-a dwelling at 7221 Montgomery Road in Midlo-
thian, Texas (the "Montgomery Residence") and a home at 9823 Marlin
Street in Dallas, Texas (the "Rental Property"). The insureds resided at
the Montgomery Residence and rented the Rental Property to a tenant.
The insureds' homeowners' policy, issued by National General, provided
coverage for the Montgomery Residence only. In 1998, the tenant in the
insured's Rental Property died, and the tenant's son sued the insureds
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Southwest, Ltd. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.,145 F.
Supp. 2d 794, 796 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast
Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 1997)).
166. Id.
167. Malone v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (citations
omitted).
168. Martin Marietta Southwest, Ltd., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 797 (citing Western Heritage
Ins. Co. v. River Entertainment, 998 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 1993)).
169. No. CIV.A.3:00-CV-2604G, 2001 WL 803728 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2001).
[Vol. 551190
INSURANCE LAW
alleging that his mother died due to heat and lack of electricity in the
Rental Property and that the insureds' negligence proximately caused his
mother's death. In his pleading, the tenant's son alleged that his mother
was a tenant in a home owned by the insureds at the time of her death;
however, the petition did not specify the address of the property. Be-
cause the petition did not designate an address, National General de-
fended the insureds under a reservation of rights.170
National General filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a decla-
ration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the insureds. In evalu-
ating whether National General had a duty to defend and indemnify, the
court first looked to the terms of the Homeowners' policy. The court
noted that the policy specifically did not apply to "bodily injury ... aris-
ing out of a premises ... rented to others by an insured ... that is not an
insured location.1 71 The policy further defined an "insured location" as
the "residence premises.' u72 In determining whether the allegations trig-
gered coverage, it appears that the court considered extrinsic evidence
outside the "eight corners" of the policy and the petition. The court
found that the tenant died on the premises of the Rental Property and
that the insureds did not reside in the Rental Property at the time of the
tenant's death. Thus, the court held that the Rental Property was not an
"insured location" under the terms of the Policy, and National General
had no duty to defend or indemnify the insureds in the underlying litiga-
tion.173 This decision is consistent with the reasoning in prior cases that
have looked to extrinsic evidence to determine whether a defendant qual-
ifies as an insured under a policy.
C. LIFE AND HEALTH POLICIES
Rodriguez v. Unum: Driving While Intoxicated Constitutes Commission
of Crime ; Therefore, Life Insurance Policy Does Not Provide Coverage
for Fatal Accident Caused When Insured Was Driving While Intoxicated
In Rodriguez v. Unum Life Ins. Co.,174 a Texas federal court addressed
whether an insured's automobile accident was covered by a life insurance
policy when the accident occurred when the insured was intoxicated. In
this case, the insured was killed in a traffic accident when his car crossed
the double center yellow line and collided with a second vehicle. The
decedent's blood alcohol content at the time of the accident was 0.17%.
The insured's wife filed a claim to recover under the insured's life and
accidental death and dismemberment benefits, and the insurer, Unum
Life Insurance Company, denied coverage on the ground that the dece-
dent's death resulted from or was contributed to by the commission of a
170. Id. at *1.
171. Id. at *3.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. No. 41-00-CV-1805-A, 2001 WL 881287 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2001).
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crime. The policy specifically excluded accidental losses caused by, con-
tributed to by, or resulting from "an attempt to commit or commission of
a crime under state or federal law."'1 75 The insured's wife sued Unum
alleging that it acted in bad faith in denying her claim, and Unum moved
for summary judgment.
The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support summary
judgment. Specifically, the evidence established "that at the time of his
death, the insured was intoxicated, having an alcohol concentration of
more than 0.10%."176 Furthermore, the court found that the insured vio-
lated the Texas Penal Code by operating his vehicle while intoxicated and
causing bodily injury to the other driver. Accordingly, because the in-
sured's death resulted from or was contributed to by the commission of a
crime, the court held that the claim was excluded under the Policy. 177
Although this outcome seems harsh, it appears to be a technically accu-
rate application of the exclusion to the factual situation presented.
D. AUTOMOBILE POLICIES
1. Temporary Substitute Vehicle Exception
Sink v. Progressive: Although Policy Excluded Coverage for Person Us-
ing Vehicle Without Permission, Exception to Exclusion Allowed Coverage
for Driver Using Vehicle Without Permission as a Temporary Substitute
Sink v. Progressive County Mutual Ins. Co.,178 involved the construc-
tion of the following exclusion in an automobile liability policy: "We do
not provide Liability Coverage for any person:
8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is enti-
tled to do so.
This exclusion (8.) does not apply to you or any family member while
using your covered auto."'1 79 The policy also defined the term "[yjour
covered auto" to mean "[any auto or trailer you do not own while used
as a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition
which is out of normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing,
loss, or destruction."' 80
The insured, Joshua McCauley, purchased an automobile policy cover-
ing his pickup truck from Progressive County Mutual Insurance Com-
pany. The insured's pickup truck became disabled, and the insured
borrowed his employer's car without permission to pick up tools so he
could work on his truck. When the insured was returning to work in his
employer's car, he was involved in an accident with Paul Sink. Sink sued
the insured and was ultimately awarded damages in the underlying law-
175. Id. at *1.
176. Id. at *3.
177. Id. at *2.
178. 47 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
179. Id. at 716-17.
180. Id. at 717.
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suit. After Sink filed the underlying litigation, Progressive filed a declara-
tory judgment action seeking a declaration that it was not required to
provide coverage to the insured. Progressive based its argument on a
policy exclusion that excluded liability coverage for any person using a
vehicle without a reasonable belief that he had the right to do so. 181 Pro-
gressive received a favorable judgment holding that it had no obligation
to the insured.182
The insured then filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge of the
obligation owed to Sink. Sink obtained the right of action against the
insurer from the bankruptcy court and sued Progressive. Sink sought to
recover from Progressive the policy limits, "as well as the total amount of
the judgment rendered against [the insured] under a Stowers cause of ac-
tion, breach of duty to settle," and violation of the Insurance Code. 83
The trial court found that Sink was not entitled to pursue any extra-con-
tractual actions against Progressive, because the bankruptcy court had
held that Sink could not pursue such actions. Since Sink had appealed
the ruling as to the extra-contractual claims, the trial court severed the
contractual claims from the extra-contractual claims. The trial court de-
termined that the sole issue in the contract claim was to be determined as
a matter of law and ordered that Sink take nothing on his contract
claim. 184
On appeal, Sink argued that coverage existed because the facts fell
within an exception to the exclusion, which provided that the exclusion
did not apply to the insured while driving a covered automobile, defined
as including a temporary substitute vehicle. The issue before the court
was whether the fact that the insured was using a vehicle without the
permission of its owner automatically excluded liability coverage, even if
the vehicle was being used as a temporary substitute vehicle. The Texar-
kana Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the insured
"was driving a temporary substitute vehicle because his own vehicle had
become disabled."'1 85 The court held that "the unambiguous language of
the policy indicated that in such a situation, the entitlement exclusion did
not apply."'1 86 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
ruling. 187
2. Unauthorized Driver
Eilander v. Federated: Driver Who Received Permission to Operate
Company-Owned Vehicle from Employee Who Lacked Authority to Grant
Such Permission Was Not Insured Under Company's Policies and, There-
181. Id. at 716.
182. Id. at 721.
183. Sink, 47 S.W.3d at 721.
184. Id.





fore, Was Not Entitled to Defense in Litigation Arising from Automobile
Accident
In Eilander v. Federated Mutual Ins. Co.,188 a Texas federal court ad-
dressed the scope of the permissive user provision under a commercial
automobile policy and excess policy. In this case, David Eilander was
killed when the vehicle in which he was a passenger was involved in a
one-car accident. At the time of the accident, Eilander had allegedly
given permission to Tina Walker to drive his company-owned vehicle.
Walker was drunk at the time of the accident, and both Walker and Ei-
lander were killed. Eilander's parents filed a wrongful death action
against Walker in state court. The Eilanders claimed that their son had
given Walker permission to drive his company-owned vehicle and, there-
fore, Walker was an insured under the company's commercial automobile
and excess policies. The insurer denied coverage on the grounds that
Walker was not an insured. The Eilanders obtained a $6 million judg-
ment against Walker. After an assignment of benefits and claims, the
Eilanders sued the insurer to collect the judgment, and the insurer moved
for summary judgment on the ground that Walker was not an insured
under the applicable policies. 189
The key issue was whether Walker was an insured driver under the
company policies. The Eilanders alleged that their son, as a manager, had
authority to authorize Walker to drive the company vehicle and, there-
fore, Walker was a covered permissive user. The court, however, rejected
this argument finding that only a named insured was authorized to make
a permissive user of a covered vehicle an additional insured under the
policies. The court found that Eilander was not authorized to permit a
non-employee to drive a company vehicle. Specifically, the summary
judgment evidence established that Eilander had been advised on two
separate occasions about the company's policy of not allowing non-em-
ployees to drive the pickup. Accordingly, the court held that the insurer
had no duty to defend or indemnify, because Walker was not a permissive
user under the policies.190
3. "Occupying" Vehicle
Old American County v. Sanchez: Insured Is Not Deemed to be "Occu-
pying" Vehicle When Lying Underneath Car to Conduct Repairs
In Old American County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanchez,191 the
Austin Court of Appeals addressed two issues: (1) whether an insured is
deemed to be occupying a vehicle when he is underneath the vehicle per-
forming repairs, and (2) whether a spouse who is the applicant for an
188. No. 4:00-CV-1746-A, 2001 WL 770986 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2001, no pet.).
189. Id. at *1.
190. Id. at *34.




automobile insurance policy, but not the "named insured," can waive PIP
and UM coverage for the insured. The insured, Mr. Sanchez, "was in-
jured when an uninsured motorist struck a truck owned by [him] but not
listed as a covered vehicle on his automobile insurance policy."1 92 At the
time of the accident, Sanchez was working on the gas tank hose under-
neath the truck when the accident occurred. Sanchez sought to recover
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage and personal injury protection
from his insurer. The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
a declaration that it was not obligated to pay for Sanchez's injuries, and
Sanchez counterclaimed.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer on
the ground that Sanchez's claim was barred by the owned-vehicle exclu-
sion because he was occupying an uninsured truck at the time of the acci-
dent. The insurer argued that Sanchez was "occupying" an uninsured
vehicle at the time of the accident and, therefore, was not covered. On
the other hand, Sanchez argued that he was not struck by his vehicle for
purposes of the insurance exception, because his vehicle was not the
striking force responsible for the accident. The trial court found that
Sanchez was "occupying" the vehicle and granted summary judgment in
favor of the insurer.193
The court of appeals noted that the policy defined "occupying" as "in,
upon, getting in, on, out or off."'194 Based on the facts, the Court deter-
mined that Sanchez's claim would be barred unless he was found to be
"upon" the vehicle. Although the term "upon" was not defined in the
policy, the court of appeals noted that under Texas law, the term suggests
that one needs to be supported by an object to be deemed "upon" the
object. The court declined to broaden the term "upon" to include
"touching a vehicle from underneath while resting on the ground beneath
the vehicle. ' 195 Therefore, because Sanchez was not "upon" the vehicle,
the court sustained Sanchez's appeal on this issue. 196 However, as dis-
cussed in the following section, the court found that Sanchez's claim was
barred because the PIP and UIM benefits had been waived.
4. Waiver of PIP and UIM Benefits
Old American County v. Sanchez: Spouse May Waive PIP and UIM
Coverage for Insured
In Sanchez, as an additional ground for summary judgment, the insurer
argued that the policy waived coverage for PIP and UIM benefits and
charges were never assessed for these items. Sanchez did not dispute that
the policy waived PIP and UM coverage. Instead, Sanchez argued that
192. Id. at *1.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *2.
195. Id. at *4.
196. Old Am. County, 2001 WL 1422581, at *5.
20021 1195
SMU LAW REVIEW
the waiver was not effective because his wife had purchased and signed
the policy instead of him, and his wife was not the named insured. Thus,
Sanchez argued that his wife was not authorized to waive such coverage.
The trial court did not rule on this ground.197
On appeal, Sanchez challenged the summary judgment on the other
issue, and the insurer cross-appealed arguing that summary judgment
should have been granted on the issue of waiver. In addressing whether
Sanchez's spouse's rejection of PIP and UM was valid, the court noted
that "[glenerally for the purpose of insurance policies, the spouse of the
named insured is treated the same as the named insured."' 198 The court
also noted that "[t]he definitions in Sanchez's policy specifically stated
that 'you' and 'your' in the policy referred to both the named insured and
the spouse of the named insured."1 99 Thus, the court concluded that the
Sanchezes were treated the same under the policy and had the same
rights to waive PIP and UM coverage. The court further found that to
allow the Sanchezes to recover PIP and UM benefits without paying for
the coverage and after waiving such benefits would contravene the legis-
lature's intent to allow written waivers of PIP and UM.200 Moreover, the
court held that it was clear from the application that Sanchez's spouse
intended to take out a policy in both their names, and the fact that the
insurance company entered Sanchez as the only "named insured" should
not invalidate the waiver. 201 Accordingly, the court held that the waiver
by Sanchez's spouse was valid.
5. Estoppel
Forsyth v. Allstate: Insurer Estopped from Claiming Insured's Dismissal
of Third-Party Claim With Prejudice, Pursuant to Settlement Agreement,
Barred UIM Claim Where Insurer Consented to Settlement
In Forsyth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 20 2 the Beaumont Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether an insured's release of claims against an underinsured
motorist with prejudice precluded the insured from recovering under his
own underinsured motorist coverage. In this case, the insured was in-
volved in a collision with an underinsured motorist, and the insured and
his wife sued the underinsured motorist. The insured eventually decided
to release his claims in exchange for the other driver's liability policy lim-
its. Before signing the release, the insured sought permission from his
insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company, because he did not want
to be barred from pursuing an underinsured motorist claim under the
policy. The insured's policy "required him to prove that he was legally
'entitled to recover' from the driver of an underinsured motor vehi-
197. Id.
198. Id. at *6.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Old Am. County, 2001 WL 1422581, at *6.
202. No. 09-00-227-CV, 2001 WL 726319 (Tex. App.-Beaumont April 26, 2001).
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cle."'203 Thus, "[the insured] was concerned that releasing the other
driver from liability without Allstate's approval might bar his UIM claim
on the grounds that he was no longer 'legally entitled to recover' against
[the other driver]. '204 Allstate consented to the insured's settlement, and
the insured released his suit against the other driver with prejudice.
The insured then sued Allstate for UIM benefits. Despite the fact that
Allstate gave the insured permission to settle the third-party claim, All-
state sought and received summary judgment on the grounds that the in-
sured had dismissed his third-party lawsuit "with prejudice" and,
therefore, he was no longer legally entitled to recover from the other
driver. The insured appealed on the ground that Allstate gave him per-
mission to settle and was, therefore, estopped from asserting the contrac-
tual provision.205 In reaching its decision, the Beaumont Court of
Appeals noted that Allstate argued that the insured's claim "was barred
only because of the method of dismissal of the lawsuit-with, rather than
without, prejudice. ' 20 6 The court further noted that Allstate's settlement
authorization letter did not warn the insured that the method of dismissal
had any significance. Rather, Allstate clearly advised the insured, with-
out reservation, that it was waiving subrogation rights and that the in-
sured could settle "without hampering any rights to a possible future
UIM Claim. ' 20 7 Since the insured relied on Allstate's promise, the court
held that Allstate was estopped from claiming that the insured's settle-
ment of the third-party claim barred the UIM claim. Accordingly, the
court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case.20 8
6. Coverage for Injury While Exiting Vehicle
Texas Farm Bureau v. Sturrock: Insured's Injury Occurring When His
Foot Became Entangled While Exiting Vehicle Is Deemed "Motor Vehicle
Accident" Within Policy
In Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sturrock20 9 the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals addressed whether an injury that occurred when
the insured's foot became entangled while exiting a vehicle was a "motor
vehicle accident" under the insured's automobile policy. In this case, the
insured made a claim for personal injury protection benefits for an injury
incurred as he exited his pickup truck. The insurer denied the claim, and
the insured filed suit against his insurer alleging breach of contract and
bad faith. The trial court held that the insured's injuries resulted from a
"motor vehicle accident" under the policy. The trial court severed the
203. Id. at *1 (internal citations omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Forsyth, 2001 WL 726319, at *1.
207. Id.
208. Id. at *4.




bad faith and breach and contract claims into separate lawsuits, then en-
tered judgment in favor of the insured for the breach of contract claim.210
The key issue on appeal was whether the insured's incident constituted
a "motor vehicle accident." In reaching its decision, the court analyzed
two lines of cases: (1) cases where the vehicle is only incidentally involved
and provides the "mere situs" for an incident that could have occurred
anywhere, and (2) cases where the injury-producing act involved the use
of a vehicle as a vehicle. Applying these principles to the facts, the court
noted that the inherent nature of the insured's pickup truck is an instru-
ment of conveyance," which necessarily involves both mounting and dis-
mounting.211 Since the insured was exiting the truck when his foot got
caught on a part of the truck itself, the court found that "no intervening
instrumentality disrupted the causal chain between the use of the truck as
a vehicle and the injury resulting from that use."' 212 The court further held
that "viewing the policy as a whole, the term 'motor vehicle accident'
does not necessitate any physical impact, provided the facts demonstrate
causation between the use of the vehicle and the accidental injury to the
covered person." Thus, despite the fact that the truck was stationary, the
court held that the insured was still using the truck as a means of trans-
portation at the time of the injury. Accordingly, the court held that "[the
insured's] injury was caused by a "motor vehicle accident" within the
meaning of his automobile policy. '213
E. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Insurer's Waiver of Subrogation Rights Does Not Violate Public Policy
In American Risk Funding Ins. Co. v. Lambert,214 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals addressed whether a carrier can waive the statutory
right of workers' compensation subrogation. The case arose after several
employees were injured in a chemical plant explosion on the job. The
employees filed suit against the owner and operator of the premises
where they were injured and the general contractor that performed work
at the plant for their employer. American Risk Funding Insurance Com-
pany, the workers' compensation carrier, intervened for reimbursement
for medical and indemnity benefits that it had paid to the employees in
the event the defendants were held liable. The employees eventually set-
tled with the defendants for $1.8 million; however, they denied American
Risk's subrogation claim on the grounds that American Risk had previ-
ously entered into a written contract with their employer waiving subro-
gation rights. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employees. 215
210. Id.
211. Id. at *4.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 59 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
215. Id. at 256.
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On appeal, American Risk argued that enforcement of the waiver of a
workers' compensation carrier's right to subrogation is against public pol-
icy, because it would allow the employees to have a double recovery. The
court rejected this argument, finding that the "employer purchased the
workers' compensation benefits as well as the waiver of subrogation and
assuming the waiver was valid, [the employees] did not receive anything
more than they were entitled to under the terms of the waiver.121 6 The
court also noted that there was no proof that the employees received a
double recovery.217 Rather, the court found that the parties considered
the waiver of subrogation rights in arriving at the settlement amount.2 18
Furthermore, the court cited several cases upholding the right of a
workers' compensation carrier to either change, reduce or eliminate its
subrogation rights by contract. In addition, the court noted that Texas
courts have upheld waiver of subrogation rights in third-party actions that
did not involve public policy arguments. Finally, the court noted that
"where public policy was urged to prevent a worker from contracting
away his workers' compensation rights in favor of his employers' benefit
plan, the Texas Supreme Court held that public policy in favor of freedom
of contract allows such election .... ,219 Thus, the court concluded that if
public policy would not prevent a worker from signing away his workers'
compensation benefits, which may not be as good as those provided by
his employer, "public policy should not prevent a carrier from waiving its
rights by contract. '220 Accordingly, the court held that the waiver of sub-
rogation did not violate public policy and was not void.
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. CONTRACTUAL LIMITATION PROVISIONS
Douskos v. Eden Park: Policy Provision Requiring Insured to Bring
Breach of Contract Action "Within Two Years" is Void Under Texas Law;
Therefore, Four Year Statute of Limitations Applies
The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code prohibits parties from en-
tering into agreements, contracts or stipulations that limit the time in
which to bring suit on the agreement, contract or stipulation to periods
shorter than two years. 221 In Douskos v. Eden Park Insurance Co.,222 a
Texas federal court addressed the validity of a policy provision requiring
an insured to bring an action within two years after the date on which the
216. Id. at 257.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 257.
219. Am. Risk Funding, 59 S.W.3d at 258 (citing Lawrence v. CDB Serv., Inc., 44
S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2001)).
220. Id.
221. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.070(a) (Vernon 1997). Any provision
that limits the time in which to bring suit for a period shorter than two years is void under
Texas law.
222. No. CIV.A. A-01-CV-192 JRN, 2001 WL 699092 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 2001).
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loss or damage occurred. In that case, the insured purchased an insurance
policy from Eden Park Insurance Company covering property at his auto
repair shop. The policy contained the following limitation provision:
No one may bring legal action against us under this Coverage Part
unless: 1. There has been full compliance with all the terms of this
Coverage Part; and 2. The action is brought within 2 years after the
date on which the direct physical loss or damage occurred.223
On November 30, 1997, a theft occurred at the repair shop, and the
insured submitted a claim to Eden Park. Eden Park closed the insured's
case without payment on December 10, 1998. On February 15, 2001, the
insured sued Eden Park in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas alleging breach of contract and bad faith claims.
Eden Park argued that the contract claims were barred by the two-year
limitation contained in the insurance policy and that the insured's tort
claims were also barred by the two year statute of limitations. The in-
sured asserted that the two-year provision contained in the insurance pol-
icy was void under Texas law and, therefore, the statute of limitations on
the contract claims is four years.2 24
The issue before the court was whether the phrase "within 2 years"
constituted a period shorter than two years in contravention of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. If it did, then the four-year statute of
limitations for contract claims applied and the insured would be allowed
to proceed. If not, then the insured's contract claim was time barred. In
construing the phrase, the court noted that courts have construed the
phrase "within two years" differently. While some courts have held that
the phrase includes two years or more, other courts have held that it
means a period shorter than two years. Despite these different construc-
tions, the Court noted that under Texas law, the phrase "within 2 years" is
construed to mean a period shorter than two years. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court relied on Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Loper,225 a case holding that a limitation provision which called for
causes of action to be filed "within two years" violated a prior version of
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.070 and was void.
Thus, applying Texas law, the court held that the limitation provision in
question was void and, therefore, the plaintiff's contract claims were sub-
ject to the four-year statue of limitations. 226
223. Id. at *2.
224. Id. at *1-2. Under Texas law, parties are prohibited from entering into agree-
ments, contracts or stipulation that limits the time in which to bring suit on an agreement,
contract or stipulation to periods shorter than two years. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 16.070(a) (Vernon 1997). Any provision that limits the time in which to bring suit
for a period shorter than two years is void.
225. 104 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, writ dismissed).
226. Douskos, 2001 WL 699092, at *2.
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B. BAD FAITH CLAIMS
1. Insurer's Closure of Case
Douskos v. Eden Park: Insured's Bad Faith Claim Accrued When In-
sured Received Notice That Insurer Had Closed the Case and Effectively
Denied the Claim
In Douskos, with regard to the tort claims, it was undisputed that the
statute of limitations was two years, and the claims began to accrue on
the date the claim at issue was denied. The parties, however, disputed
when the claim was denied. The insured argued that Eden Park denied
the claim on March 19, 2001, when it answered the lawsuit. The insured
also alleged that Eden Park's letter closing the file on December 10, 1998,
was not a proper denial, therefore, the limitations clock did not start
when the letter was sent. The court rejected this argument finding that
the evidence established that the insured failed to exercise due diligence
in pursuing his insurance claim. Specifically, the court stated that "any
activity or inquiry by the [insured] within the three and a half years would
have revealed that the defendant had closed the case and effectively de-
nied the claim on December 10, 1998. It was that action that unambigu-
ously demonstrated the defendant's intent not to pay the claim. '227
The court found that "no reasonable finder of fact could find that the
insured acted with diligence in seeking judicial recourse for his injury. '228
Specifically, the court concluded that the insured's deadline for filing the
bad faith causes of action was December 10, 2000, because the insured
suffered legal injury when he received the December 10, 1998, letter noti-
fying him that his insurance claim had been closed. Since the insured
failed to timely file the claim, the court held that the insured's bad faith
causes of action were time barred and should be dismissed.2 29
2. Accrual of Cause of Action
Cantrell v. Farmers: Statute of Limitations for Bad Faith Denial Accrues
Upon Insurer's Denial of Coverage
In Cantrell v. Farmers Group, Insurance,2 30 an insured attempted to
avoid the rule established in Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc.2 31 that a
cause of action for bad faith accrues upon denial. The case arose when
Lon Cantrell sustained injuries while performing his job duties. Cantrell
received medical treatment and some weekly benefit payments from Mid-
Century Insurance Company, his workers' compensation insurance car-
rier. Cantrell initially received treatment from a physician, who referred
him to an orthopedic specialist. The orthopedist recommended that Can-
227. Id. at *3.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 2001 WL 842031 (Tex. App.-Austin July 26, 2001, pet. denied) (no publication).
231. 800 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1990).
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trell not return to work; however, the referring physician advised Can-
trell's employer that he could return to work and perform light duty.
Cantrell's employer extended him a job offer for light-duty. Cantrell de-
clined the offer and was terminated for rejecting the light-duty job offer.
On March 31, 1997, Cantrell's workers' compensation benefits were de-
nied based on his failure to accept the job offer. Cantrell did not file suit
against his employer until May 6, 1999, and did not assert claims against
Mid-Century until he filed an amended petition on November 22, 1999.
Mid-Century moved for summary judgment on the limitations defense,
and the court granted summary judgment.232
On appeal, the parties did not dispute that Cantrell's bad faith claims
were subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Instead, the parties dis-
puted when Cantrell's cause of action accrued. In determining when the
cause of action for breach of good faith and fair dealing accrued, the
court looked to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Murray holding
that "the injury producing event is the denial of coverage-when the in-
surer unreasonably fails to pay the claim-and thus the cause of action
accrues and the statute begins to run at denial. '233
Cantrell, creatively, but unsuccessfully, argued that Murray had been
impliedly overruled by Universe Life Insurance Co. v. Giles.234 In Giles,
the Texas Supreme Court held that "a claimant must prove the insurer
failed to attempt to effectuate settlement after its liability became reason-
ably clear" in order to successfully prosecute a claim for bad faith.235
Cantrell argued that the wording set forth in Giles alters when the action
accrues and impliedly overrules Murray. Specifically, Cantrell argued
that under Giles, it is now a question of "what the carrier knew, and
when, that causes the action to accrue. ' 236 Cantrell contended that al-
though Mid-Century arguably had a reasonable basis for denying his
claim, the cause of action did not accrue until it became reasonably clear
to the carrier that it wrongfully withheld benefits. Rejecting this argu-
ment, the court concluded that it did not believe the Texas Supreme
Court intended to alter the date of accrual of the action. The court held
that the "[d]enial of the claim is still the act of injury and thus the trigger-
ing event for when limitations begin to run. '237 Thus, the court held that
the claims were barred, because Cantrell did not file his action until more
than two years after the denial.
232. Cantrell, 2001 WL 842031, at *1.
233. Id. (citing Murray, 800 S.W.2d at 830)).
234. 950 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex. 1997).
235. Cantrell, 2001 WL 842031, at *3 (citing Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d
48, 51 (Tex. 1997)).
236. Id.




A. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 38.006 FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Grapevine Excavation v. Maryland Lloyds: Texas Supreme Court Re-
solves Issue of Whether Section 38.006 Exempts Insurers Subject to Its
Terms From Paying Attorneys' Fees
Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code generally
provides that litigants may recover reasonable attorney's fees incurred in
a valid claim based upon a written contract.238 Section 38.006, however,
provides an exception to this general rule. Section 38.006 provides that
Chapter 38 does not apply to a contract issued by insurers who are sub-
ject to the following provisions of the Insurance Code: (1) article 3.62, (2)
article 3.62-1, (3) chapter 9, (4) article 21.21, or (5) the Unfair Claim Set-
tlement Practices Act (article 21.21-2).239 For years the Fifth Circuit and
the Texas appellate courts have interpreted section 38.006 differently.
The Fifth Circuit has interpreted section 38.006 to exempt insurers who
are subject to the provisions listed in section 38.006 from paying attor-
ney's fees in breach of contract claims.2 40 In contrast, the Texas appellate
courts have held that the purpose of section 38.006 is to deny attorney's
fees under chapter 38 only when attorney's fees are already available
under other specific statutes.241
In Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v. Maryland Lloyds,242 the Texas Su-
preme Court finally determined which interpretation should be adopted.
In that case, an insured sued its insurer for breach of contract for refusing
to defend a lawsuit. A federal district court in Texas concluded that the
insurer did not owe a duty to defend. 243 The insured appealed, and the
238. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001(8) (Vernon 1997).
239. § 38.006.
240. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 975 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th Cir. 1992);
see also Lafarge Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1995).
241. Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Southwest Aggregates, Inc., 982 S.W.2d 600,
613 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.); Whitehead v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952
S.W.2d 79, 87-88 (Tex. App.-Texarkana) rev'd on other grounds, 988 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.
1999); Novosad v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1994, no writ); Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mclnnis Book Store, Inc., 860 S.W.2d 484, 490-
91 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ); Chitsey v. Nat'l Lloyd's Ins. Co., 698 S.W.2d
766, 772 (Tex. App.-Austin), affd, 738 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1987); Hochheim Prairie Farm
Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Burnett, 698 S.W.2d 271, 278 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ);
Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 696 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 694 S.W.2d 572, 574-75 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1985, no writ); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. McWilliams, 680 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1984) writ ref'd n.r.e.); Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Thomas,678
S.W.2d 278, 283-84 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bellefonte Underwrit-
ers Ins. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 575 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], rev'd in part on
other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. 1986); Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 649
S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Prudential Co. of Am. v.
Burke, 614 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
242. 35 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2000).




Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, hold-
ing that the insurer breached its contract by refusing to defend its insured
in the underlying lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to determine the appropriate remedy,244 but retained juris-
diction for the limited purpose of deciding whether the insured was enti-
tled to recover attorney's fees incurred in pursuing the breach of contract
action. 245 Recognizing that it has interpreted Section 38.006 differently
from Texas appellate courts, the Fifth Circuit certified the question to the
Texas Supreme Court.2 46
After considering both interpretations of the statute, the Texas Su-
preme Court concluded that it should follow "established and longstand-
ing Texas authority that interprets section 38.006 to allow recovery of
attorney's fees in successful breach-of-contract action against an insurer
unless attorney's fees are otherwise available. '247 The Court cited two
important reasons for its decision. First, the Court noted that the "Legis-
lature has not substantially changed Section 38.006 since its enactment"
even though the appellate courts have consistently held that section
38.006 allows recovery of attorneys' fees against insurers in breach of
contract suits. Thus, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the es-
tablished judicial interpretation of Section 38.006. Second, the Court
held that stare decisis demands this result.2 48 The Court denied the mo-
tion for rehearing in January of 2001.
B. ARTICLE 6.15
Morris County National Bank v. John Deere: Article 6.15 Does Not Im-
pose Duty on Insurer to Notify an Insured's Mortgagee of a Policy's Im-
pending Expiration
Article 6.15 of the Texas Insurance Code provides:
The interest of a mortgagee or trustee under any fire insurance con-
tract hereafter issued covering any property situated in this State
shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or
owner of said described property or the happening of any condition
beyond his control, and any stipulation in any contract in conflict
herewith shall be null and void.249
The purpose of the article is "to protect mortgagees from mortgagor
derelictions with respect to insurance policies on mortgaged proper-
ties."250 The statute "immunizes the mortgagee against the legal conse-
quences of any act done by the mortgagor or owner either prior to or
244. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grapevine Excavation, Inc., 197 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.
1999).
245. Id. at 1.
246. Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v. Maryland Lloyds, 35 S.W.3d at 2 (Tex. 2000).
247. Id. at 5.
248. Id.
249. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.15.
250. Morris County Nat'l Bank v. John Deere Ins. Co., 254 F.3d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 407 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1969).
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subsequent to the issuance of the policy in question. '251 In order to
achieve this effect, Article 6.15 creates a new and independent contract
between the mortgagee and the insurer.252
In Morris County National Bank v. John Deere Ins. Co.,2 53 the Fifth
Circuit addressed whether article 6.15 of the Texas Insurance Code im-
poses a duty on an insurer to notify its insured's mortgagee of the policy's
impending expiration when the insurance policy does not require such
notice. In this case, the insured borrowed $50,000 from Morris County to
purchase a buncher, which is a piece of heavy equipment used in the tim-
ber industry to cut down trees. The buncher was insured under a fire
insurance policy that named Morris County as the loss payee. The policy
was effective from September 24, 1996 to September 24, 1997, and Morris
County had a copy of the policy that stated its term. Although the policy
did not require the insurer to give either the insured or Morris County
notice of its expiration, on September 19, 1997, the insurer warned the
insured that the policy would expire on September 24, 1997 unless re-
newal premiums were paid. The insurer, however, did not give Morris
County the same notice. The insured failed to pay the renewal premium,
and the policy expired. The insurer notified the insured, but not Morris
County, that the policy had expired. After the policy expired, a fire de-
stroyed the buncher, and Morris County demanded $50,000 under the
policy to cover the loss. The insurer denied Morris County's demand on
the grounds that the policy had expired prior to the loss.
Morris County filed a declaratory judgment action seeking judgment
that the insurer owed Morris County, "as a mortgagee, reasonable notice
of the termination of coverage under the policy before any such termina-
tion would become effective as to its interests. '254 Both parties filed mo-
tions for summary judgment. "The district court concluded that article
6.15 [of the Texas Insurance Code] required the insurer to give Morris
County notice of the policy's expiration, and, since no notice was given,
Morris County still had an interest in the policy. Accordingly, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Morris County."255
The issue on appeal was whether article 6.15 imposed a "duty on an
insurer to notify its insured's mortgagee of the policy's impending expira-
tion when the insurance policy does not require such notice. ' 256 In ad-
dressing this issue, the court looked to the legislative purpose of Article
6.15. The court explained that "[w]hile article 6.15 grants the mortgagee
an independent contract with independent rights, it does not free the
mortgagee from the responsibilities and limitations of that independent
251. Id. (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 350 S.W.2d 534, 537
(1961)).
252. Id. (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 350 S.W.2d 534, 591 (Tex.
1961)).
253. 254 F.3d 538 (5th Cir. 2001).





contract. '257 The court noted that in Texas, an insurer is not required to
notify the insured of the policy's expiration in the absence of contrary
policy provisions. The court further explained that "[w]hile Texas law
clearly grants a mortgagee a contract independent of the mortgagor's, it
does not grant a contract better than the mortgagor's. '258 Accordingly,
the court found that the insurer did not have a duty under Article 6.15 to
notify an insured's mortgagee of the policy's impending expiration. Thus,
the court held that Morris County lost coverage on September 24, 1997,
not because the insured's contract expired or because of his act or omis-
sion, but because Morris County's own contract expired. 259
C. CANCELLATION NOTICES
1. Premium Finance Company's Cancellation of Policy
INAC v. Underwriters: Premium Finance Company May Cancel Policy
by Same Means as Insured
In INAC Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 260 the Houston Court of Ap-
peals addressed whether a premium finance company could cancel a pol-
icy by mailing notices to the insurers in care of the agent appointed to
receive notices of cancellation from the insured. In this case, an insured
entered into a contract with a premium finance company under which the
premium finance company agreed to finance approximately $900,000 in
premiums for the insured's purchase of various insurance policies. The
contract required the insured to pay the premium finance company
eleven monthly installments. As security for its debt, the insured as-
signed the premium finance company all unearned premiums, policy divi-
dends, and loss payments under the policies. The insured also authorized
the premium finance company to cancel the financed policies. 261
Pursuant to the agreement, the premium finance company forwarded
the total premium amount to Insurance Alliance, as the agent for the
underwriters at Lloyd's ("Underwriters"). "Insurance Alliance then ac-
cepted the check and deposited the proceeds into its own account. After
first deducting and retaining its commissions, Insurance Alliance for-
warded the premium funds to Underwriters. '262 Thereafter, the insured
failed to make its June payment, and the premium finance company gave
the insured notice of default and notice of its intent to cancel. After the
insured failed to cure the default, the premium finance company "at-
tempted to cancel the policies by mailing notice of cancellation to the
Underwriters in care of Insurance Alliance. '263 The premium finance
257. Id. at 541.
258. Morris, 254 F.3d at 542.
259. Id.
260. 56 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, rehearing overruled, pet.
denied).
261. Id. at 245.




company filed suit against Underwriters, their agent, and the surplus
lines' agent to recover unearned premiums after canceling the policies.
The main issue in this case was whether the premium finance company
complied with the Insurance Code when it sent notice of cancellation to
Insurance Alliance. Although Underwriters had authorized Insurance
Alliance to receive notices of cancellation from the insured, Underwriters
claimed that the insurance policies and article 24.17 of the Insurance
Code required the premium finance company to forward notice of cancel-
lation directly to Underwriters rather than to their agent, Insurance Alli-
ance. Thus, Underwriters argued that this was not proper notice under
Article 24.17. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Underwriters. 264
On appeal, the Houston Court of Appeals first addressed whether the
premium finance company's notice of cancellation complied with Article
24.17. The court noted that under Article 24.17, the premium finance
company was required to send notice of cancellation to (1) the insurer,
(2) the insured, and (3) the insurance agent or insurance broker indicated
on the finance agreement. Underwriters did not dispute that INAC prop-
erly mailed notice of the cancellation to the insured and to the broker.
The only challenge Underwriters raised regarding Article 24.17 con-
cerned notice to Underwriters. Thus, the issue was whether the language
"mailing to the insurer a notice of cancellation in Article 24.17(d) pre-
cluded [the premium finance company] from sending notice of cancella-
tion to the Underwriters in care of Insurance Alliance. '2 65 Although the
insured could have canceled the policies by sending a cancellation notice
to the Underwriters in care of Insurance Alliance, Underwriters argued
that "the policies did not state that cancellation [could] be made in this
manner by a premium finance company. '266 The court noted that the
language of Article 24.17 was unambiguous and that the only reasonable
interpretation of it is "that a premium finance company may use the same
methods of mailing the notice to the insurer that are available to the in-
sured. ' 267 Thus, the court held that "[a]rticle 24.17 allows premium-fi-
nance companies to cancel an insurance policy by mailing notice of
cancellation to the insurer in care of the agent appointed by the insurer to
receive notices of cancellation from the insured. ' 268 Accordingly, the
court held that the trial court erred in granting Underwriters' motion for
summary judgment. 269
2. Cancellation Notices in Contracts
Insurance Co. of North America v. Aberdeen: Where Subcontractor's
Insurer Had Duty to Provide Cancellation Notice Directly to General Con-
264. Id. at 246-47.
265. INCA Corp., 56 S.W.3d at 248.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 248.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 251.
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tractor Under Contract, Failure to Do So Rendered Cancellation Ineffec-
tive as to General Contractor
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Aberdeen Ins. Services, Inc.,270
the Fifth Circuit recently held that a government subcontractor's insurer
had a duty to provide cancellation notice directly to the general contrac-
tor. The United States Department of Energy ("DOE") contracted with
a general contractor to construct an oil pipeline project. Under the con-
tract, the general contractor was required to maintain comprehensive
general liability and third party property damage insurance, naming the
United States as an additional insured. The DOE also required that it
"receive thirty days advance written notice of any changes in, or cancella-
tion of, such insurance policies. '2 71 Finally, the contract provided that
the general contractor "was fully responsible for all acts and omissions of
its subcontractors" and entitled the DOE to assess liquidated damages in
the event the contract was not timely completed.2 72
The general contractor subcontracted with another party to provide
diving services in connection with the pipeline project. The subcontrac-
tor's broker for its comprehensive general liability and property damage
insurance policies advised the general contractor that: (1) the required
insurance was in effect, (2) the general contractor was an additional in-
sured on the policies, and (3) the general contractor would be provided
thirty days notice prior to cancellation of the subcontractor's insur-
ance.273 Thereafter, the subcontractor failed to make a scheduled pre-
mium payment, and its insurance was cancelled effective January 15,
1995.274 The general contractor received no notice of cancellation.
After the subcontractor's insurance was cancelled, the subcontractor
damaged the pipeline breaking it into two sections. The subcontractor's
broker was notified of the accident and responded by sending a notice of
cancellation to the general contractor indicating that the policies had
been cancelled effective January 15, 1995 due to subcontractor's failure to
pay its premiums. As a result, the subcontractor's insurer denied cover-
age for the loss. The DOE advised the general contractor that it was
responsible for its subcontractor's performance and for the delays caused
by the accident under the contract, and the general contractor contacted
its surety for financial assistance in repairing the pipeline. 275
"Following completion of the project, the DOE and the general con-
tractor's surety entered into a settlement agreement under which the
DOE assessed liquidated damages of $615,000 ' '276 due to the general con-
tractor's failure to timely complete the project. The general contractor
270. 253 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 2001).








and its surety then sued the subcontractor's broker and insurer seeking
coverage for liquidated damages in the settlement with the DOE. In the
lawsuit, the general contractor alleged that (1) it was an additional in-
sured entitled to coverage under the subcontractor's policies, (2) the poli-
cies required that the subcontractor's insurer give the general contractor
notice prior to cancellation, and (3) the cancellation was ineffective as to
the general contractor because the subcontractor's insurer failed to pro-
vide the required notice. The district court entered a judgment that the
general contractor and its surety receive no damages.
On appeal, the general contractor and its surety argued that the sub-
contractor's insurer was required to notify the contractor of cancellation
of the subcontractor's coverage and that the failure to do so rendered the
cancellation ineffective as to the general contractor. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed finding that the general contractor had a duty to
provide notice of cancellation to the DOE, and the general contractor's
duty to provide notice was transferred to the subcontractor pursuant to
the terms of the subcontract. As a result, the court held that the subcon-
tractor's insurer had a duty to provide the general contractor notice prior
to cancellation of the subcontractor's insurance. Since the subcontrac-
tor's insurer failed to provide the required notice prior to canceling the
subcontractor's insurance, the court held that the cancellation was inef-
fective as to the general contractor's loss. 2 77
Next, the court addressed whether the subcontractor's policies covered
the general contractor's loss. The court noted that the subcontractor's
coverage applied where the subcontractor became "liable or obligated
and/or responsible to pay as damages.1278 The court found that the sub-
contractor was responsible for the damage to the pipeline, and the gen-
eral contractor was fully responsible for the acts of its subcontractors
under its contract with the DOE. Accordingly, the court held that the
subcontractor's insurance covered the general contractor's loss. There-
fore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the subcontractor's
insurer's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During 2001, several significant changes were made to the Texas Insur-
ance Code. The Texas Legislative Counsel has continued in its endeavor
to reclassify and rearrange the statutes in a more logical order, employing
a numbering system and format that will accommodate future expansion
of the law.279 The Legislative Counsel has eliminated invalid, duplicative,
and other ineffective provisions in order to avoid confusion. The 77th
Legislature also made several substantive changes to the Insurance Code.
Many of the substantive changes were enacted to expand coverage and
277. Id. at 885-86.
278. Id. at 887.




benefits under group health plans. The most significant changes are sum-
marized below.
A. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CARRIERS
1. Definition of Unfair Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts or
Practices
The Legislature amended Article 21.21, Section 4, relating to the defi-
nition of unfair competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in
the business of insurance. The Legislature expanded the list of excep-
tions to the definition of discrimination or rebates to include waiving sur-
render charges under an annuity contract "when the contract holder
exchanges the annuity contract for another annuity contract issued by the
same insurer, if the waiver and the exchange are fully, fairly, and accu-
rately explained to the contract holder in a manner that is not deceptive
or misleading. '280
2. Refund of Unearned Premium Required
The Legislature added Article 21.29, which provides that if an insurer
issues a policy that requires maintenance of an "unearned premium re-
serve for the portion of the policy premium applicable to the unexpired
or unused part of the policy period for which the premium has been paid
and the policy is canceled or terminated by the insured or the insurer
before the end of the policy term with a remaining unearned premium
reserve on the policy, the insurer must promptly refund to the policy-
holder the appropriate portion of the unearned premium."28'
3. New Agent Licensing Laws
The 77th Legislature passed three bills affecting licensed insurance
agents and agencies in Texas: Senate Bills 314, 414, and 466.282 The most
comprehensive bill was Senate Bill 414, which took effect of September 1,
2001.283 Senate Bill 414 "includes the essential components of the Uni-
form Producer Licensing Model Act proposed by the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissions, making Texas compliant with the
reciprocity requirements found in the federal Gramm, Leach, Bliley Act
of 1999." '284
Senate Bill 414 allows "non-resident corporate or partnership agencies
to obtain a license and solicit business directly within Texas. '2 85 This Bill
280. See art. 21.21, section 4, as amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 290, Section 1, eff.
Sept 1., 2001. See also Texas Department of Insurance Website, available at http://www.tdi.
state.tx.us/company/lhimplemb003601 html.
281. Art. 21.29, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 844, Section 1, eft. Sept. 1, 2001.
282. See Texas Department of Insurance website, available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/
commish/b-0034-1.html.





also consolidates "agent licenses into fewer license types. '2 86 For exam-
ple, with regard to General Lines Property and Casualty licenses, the fol-
lowing prior licenses have been consolidated into a new single license: (1)
05-10 Local Recording Agent-Temporary, (2) 06-00 Solicitor for Local
Recording Agent, and (3) 10-00 Non-Resident Property and Casualty
Agent.287
The Legislature also eliminated "the requirement that all officers, di-
rectors, and shareholders of a corporate agency or partners of a partner-
ship reside in Texas and hold an agent's license. '2 88
Senate Bill 414 further provides that the "referral by an unlicensed per-
son to an insurance agent is not the act of an agent if the unlicensed
person does not discuss specific insurance policy terms or conditions with
the customer or potential customer. '2 89 In addition, "a referral fee may
be paid to such an unlicensed person if the payment is not based upon the
purchase of insurance by the customer." 290
Finally, Senate Bill 414 provides that a "General Lines Life, Accident,
Health and HMO agent or a General Lines Property and Casualty agent
may appoint a licensed agent as a subagent to act under the sponsoring
agent's license. '291 The Bill provides that the subagent: "(1) may re-
present the insurance carriers to which the sponsoring agent is appointed
and is not required to be separately appointed by the insurance carriers;
(2) must be licensed to write each type of insurance he is employed to
write, but is not required to hold each type of license issued to the spon-
soring agent or agency; (3) may be individually appointed by insurance
carriers as well as being appointed as a subagent; and (4) may be ap-
pointed as a subagent of multiple sponsoring agents and agencies. '292
B. LIFE, HEALTH, AND ACCIDENT POLICIES
1. Insurer Antifraud Programs
The Legislature added Subchapter K (Insurer Antifraud Programs) to
Title 1, Chapter 3 of the Insurance Code. This subchapter requires that
forms provided by health insurers to persons to make a claim or to give
notice of a claim must include a "statement substantially similar to the
following: Any person who knowingly presents a false or fraudulent claim
for the payment of a loss is guilty of a crime and may be subject to fines
and confinement in state prison." 293 This requirement does not apply
286. Id. Senate Bill 414 reduces the number of agent licenses from 44 to 23.
287. See Texas Department of Insurance website, available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/
commish/b-0034-1.html.
288. Id.
289. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
290. Id.
291. Tex. Dep't of Ins. website, available at http://www/tdi.state.tx.us/commish/b-0034-1.
html.
292. Id.
293. Art. 3.97-2, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1033, Section 3, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
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against a policy issued by a reinsurer.294
Subchapter K also requires health insurers who collect direct written
premiums to adopt an antifraud plan that includes a description of the
insurer's procedures for detecting, investigating, and reporting possible
fraudulent insurance acts. 295
2. Disclosure of Contact Person to Insured or Enrollee of Health
Benefit Plan
The Legislature added article 21.24-3, which requires an issuer of a
health benefit plan to provide the following information to the insured or
enrollee upon request: (1) the name or employee identifier, (2) mailing
address, business city and state location, and (3) job title of the employee
of the issuer of the health benefit plan who is available to respond to
communications and questions from the insured or enrollee relating to
coverage and benefits provided by the health benefit plan. 296
3. Disclosure of Claims Cost Information to Employer
The Legislature added article 21.49-19, which requires issuers of group
health benefit plans to provide claims "cost information for employees
covered by the plan during the preceding calendar year" upon request of
an employer sponsoring a group health benefit plan.297 "The information
must be reported separately for each month during which the plan was in
effect. ' 298 This statute also provides that the "[i]nformation obtained by
the employer is confidential and may only be used by the employer for
purposes relating to obtaining and maintaining group health benefit plan
coverage for the employer's employees. ' 299
4. Availability of Certain Reimbursement Guidelines Used by Managed
Care Entity
Article 21.60 was added and it made reimbursement guidelines used by
managed care entities available to certain health providers. This article
requires that upon written request, "a managed care entity shall provide
[the out-of-network health care] provider with a written description of
the factors considered by the managed care entity in determining the
amount of reimbursement that the out-of-network provider may receive
for goods or services provided to a person enrolled in or insured under
the entity's managed care plan."'300 This article does not require a man-
aged care entity to disclose proprietary information, which is prohibited
294. Id.
295. Art. 3.97-3, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1033, Section 3, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
296. Art. 21.24-3, section 2, added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1266, Section 1, etf. Sept.
1, 2001.




300. Art. 21.60, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 672, Section 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
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from disclosure by a contract between the managed care entity and a ven-
dor who supplies payment or statistical data to the managed care entity.
5. Expanded Coverage for Dependents Under Group Health Plans
The Legislature expanded coverage for dependents under several pro-
visions of the Insurance Code. First, "a dependent grandchild of an em-
ployee or member who is less than 21 years old and living with and in the
household of the employee or member," may now be included within the
coverage of a group health plan, regardless of whether the employee or
member treats the grandchild as a dependent for federal income tax
purposes.301
The Legislature also enacted chapter 1027 amending section 3B of arti-
cle 3.51-6, effective September 1, 2001. Pursuant to this provision, "a
health insurance policy that provides coverage for a child of the policy-
holder must upon payment of a premium provide coverage for any un-
married child of the policyholder's child if the child is younger than 25
years of age and is a dependent of the policyholder for federal income tax
purposes at the time application for coverage of the child is made. ' '30 2
Coverage for dependent grandchildren under this provision may not be
terminated solely because the covered child is no longer a dependent of
the policyholder for federal income tax purposes. 30 3
The Legislature also amended Article 3.70-2 to provide that an insurer
may no longer require a stepchild to reside with the member or person
insured.304
Finally, with respect to pool coverage, the Legislature expanded the
definition of a "dependent" to include the following: (1) "a child who is a
student under the age of twenty-three years and who is financially depen-
dent upon the parent," (2) "a child for whom a person may be obligated
to pay child support," or (3) "a child of any age who is disabled and de-
pendent upon the parent. '30 5
301. Art. 3.51-6 section 1, subsection (b) as amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 396,
Section 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
302. Art. 3.51-6 section 3B, subsection (b), as amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.
1027, Section 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2001. The Legislature, however, also enacted Chapter 396,
Section 2, which is also effective September 1, 2001. Chapter 396 provides that for pur-
poses of the subchapter, a child of the policyholder's child is a dependent of the policy-
holder regardless of whether the policyholder treats the child as a dependent for federal
income tax purposes.
303. Id.
304. Art. 3.70-2, section 2, as amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1027, Section 2, eff.
Sept 1., 2001.
305. Art. 3.77, section 10, subsection (e), as amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1084,
Section 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2001. The Legislature also enacted Chapter 1027, which is also
effective September 1, 2001. That chapter, however, provides that a dependent includes a
child who is a student under 25 years of age and who is financially dependent upon the
parent, a child for whom a person may be obligated to pay child support, or a child of any
age who is disabled and dependent upon the parent.
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6. Women's Equal Health Care Act
The Legislature passed an Act called the Women's Equal Health Care
Act. The purpose of this Act is to require equal reimbursement and com-
pensation to women under health care plans. The Act provides that
"when reimbursing a physician or provider for reproductive health and
oncology services provided to women, a health benefit plan "must pay an
amount not less than the annual average compensation per hour or unit
as would be paid in the service area ... for the same medical, surgical,
hospital, pharmaceutical, nursing, or other similar resources, as applica-
ble, that would be used in providing health services exclusively to men or
to the general population. '30 6 A health benefit plan that is found to be in
violation of this Act is subject to: (1) "the sanctions authorized by chapter
82 of this code;" (2) "cease and desist procedures authorized by Chapter
83, including restitution which may include complainant's reasonable at-
torney fees and the greater of complete or economic damages" and (3)
"administrative penalties not to exceed $25,000 for violations of the
Act."'307 The Act also provides for judicial review, which may result in a
"civil penalty of $25,000 if a trier of fact finds that the defendant know-
ingly violated the provisions of this article. 308
7. Coverage for Prescription Contraceptive Drug and Devices and
Related Services
The Legislature enacted Article 21.52L, which expands coverage under
group health plans to cover prescription contraceptive drugs and devices
and related services. This Act became effective September 1, 2001 and
applies only to a health benefit plan that is delivered, issued for delivery,
or renewed on or after January 1, 2002. The Act prohibits "[a] health
benefit plan that provides benefits for prescription drugs or devices may
not exclude or limit benefits to enrollees for: (1) a prescription contracep-
tive drug or device approved by the United States Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, or (2) an outpatient contraceptive service. '309 The insurer
may, however, provide "a limitation that applies to all prescription drugs
or devices or all services for which benefits are provided under a health
benefit plan."' 310 Furthermore, this Article does not provide coverage for
any drugs or devices that terminate a pregnancy.311
Article 21.52L also prohibits insurers from engaging in prohibited con-
duct, which would impact the effectiveness of this Article. Specifically,
306. Art. 21.53N, section 3, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1214, Section 3, eff.
Sept. 1, 2001.
307. Art. 21.53N, section 4, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1214, Section 3, eff.
Sept. 1, 2001.
308. Art. 21.53N, section 5, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1214, Section 3, eff.
Sept. 1, 2001.






insurers are prohibited from imposing "any deductible, copayment, coin-
surance, or other cost-sharing provision applicable to benefits for pre-
scription contraceptive drugs or devices, unless the amount of the
required cost-sharing does not exceed the amount of the required cost-
sharing applicable to benefits for other prescription drugs or devices
under the plan."' 312 In addition, insurers are prohibited from imposing
any "waiting period applicable benefits for to prescription contraceptive
drugs or devices, unless the waiting period is not longer than any waiting
period applicable to benefits for other prescription drugs or devices,
under the plan."'313
Furthermore, insurers cannot "deny applicants for enrollment or deny
an enrollee eligibility or continued eligibility under the plan, or deny re-
newal of the plan, to an enrollee solely because of the applicant's or en-
rollee's use or potential use of a prescription contraceptive drug or device
or an outpatient contraceptive service. '314 "Insurers are also prohibited
from providing monetary incentive to an applicant for enrollment or en-
rollee to induce ... [them] to accept coverage that does not satisfy the
requirements" of Article 21.52L.315 Finally, insurers cannot "reduce or
limit a payment to a health care professional, or otherwise penalize the
professional, because the professional prescribes a contraceptive drug or
device or provides an outpatient contraceptive service. 3
16
This Article, however, "does not require a health benefit plan that is
issued by an entity associated with a religious organization or any physi-
cian or health care provider providing medical or health care services
under the health benefit plan to offer, recommend, offer advice concern-
ing, pay for, provide, assist in, perform, arrange, or participate in provid-
ing or performing a medical or health care service that violates the
religious convictions of the organization, except if the prescription con-
traceptive coverage is necessary to preserve the life or health of the in-
sured individual. '317
8. Coverage for Neurological Injuries
The Legislature enacted Article 21.53Q, which prohibits insurers under
health benefit plans from excluding "coverage for cognitive rehabilitation
therapy, cognitive communication therapy, neurocognitive therapy and
rehabilitation, neurobehavioral, neurophysiological, neuropsychological,
312. Art. 21.52L, section 4, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1106, Section 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 2001.
313. Art. 21.52L, section 5, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1106, Section 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 2001.
314. Art. 21.52L, section 6, subsection (1), as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1106,
Section 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
315. See Art. 21.52L, section 6, subsection (2), as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.
1106, Section 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
316. Art. 21.52L, section 6, subsection (3), as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1106,
Section 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
317. See Art. 21.52L, section 7, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1106, Section 1,
eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
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and psychophysiological testing or treatment, neurofeedback therapy,
remediation, post-acute transition services, or community reintegration
services necessary as a result of and related to an acquired brain in-
jury. ' 318 Coverage under this Article, however, "may be subject to de-
ductibles, copayments, coinsurance, or annual or maximum payment
limits that are consistent with deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and
annual or maximum payment limits applicable to other similar coverage
under a health plan. '319
9. Periodic Health Evaluations Required for Health Maintenance
Organizations
Article 20A.09B was amended to require periodic health evaluations
for each adult enrollee of a Health Maintenance Organization. The Arti-
cle now requires a "health risk assessment at least once every three years
and an annual well woman examination" for each female enrollee. 320
10. Coverage for Tests for Colorectal Cancer
Finally, the Legislature added Article 21.53S, which requires health
benefit plans that provide "benefits for screening medical procedures
must provide coverage for each person enrolled in the plan who is 50
years of age or older and at normal risk for developing colon cancer for
expenses incurred in conducting a medically recognized screening exami-
nation for the detection of colorectal cancer. ' 321 Article 21.53S provides
a list of the minimum benefits that must be provided for such screen-
ing.322 "Each health benefit plan shall provide written notice to each per-
son enrolled in the plan regarding coverage by the article. '323
C. FIRE INSURANCE
The Legislature added a provision prohibiting insurers from using en-
dorsements "that reduce[s] the amount of coverage ... that would other-
wise be provided under [a fire insurance] policy unless the insurer
provides the policyholder with a written explanation of the change made
by the endorsement before the effective date of the change. '324
318. See Art. 21.53Q, section 2, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 859, Section 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 2001.
319. Id.
320. See Art. 20A.09B, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1369, Section 1, eff. Sept.
1, 2001.
321. Art. 21.53S, section 3, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 956, Section 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 2001.
322. Art. 21.53S, section 3, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 956, Section 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 2001.
323. Art. 21.53S, section 4, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 956, Section 1, eft.
Sept. 1, 2001.
324. Art. 5.36, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 415, Section 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
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D. WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE
"Effective September 1, 2001, the Texas Workers' Compensation Insur-
ance Fund will operate as ... a domestic mutual insurance company in
accordance with Chapter 15 of this [Insurance] code, and shall be called
the Texas Mutual Insurance Company. '325 The company is subject to
Chapter 15 of the Insurance Code, except for Article 15.22 of the Insur-
ance Code.
E. ENFORCEMENT OF INSURANCE POLICIES AFFECTING CERTAIN
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS
The Legislature added Article 21.74, which suspends the statute of limi-
tations period for enforcement of certain policies affecting Holocaust vic-
tims. This article permits that a "Holocaust victim, or the heir, assignee,
beneficiary, or successor of a Holocaust victim, who resides in [Texas] and
has a claim arising out of an insurance policy purchased or in effect in
Europe before 1946 that was delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed by
an insurer may bring an action against an insurer to recover on that claim
in a court of competent jurisdiction in [Texas]." 326 This section further
provides that such an action "may not be dismissed for failure to comply
with any applicable limitations period if the action is brought before De-
cember 31, 2012."327
325. Art. 5.76-3, Section 2, as amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1195, Section 1.01,
eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
326. Art. 21.74, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 391, Section 1, eff. May 28, 2001.
327. Art. 21.74, as added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 391, Section 1, eff. May 28, 2001.
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